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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Title of Dissertation:   Emerging Trends in Marine Insurance 
 
 
Degree:    MSc 
 
 
This dissertation analyses the emerging trends in the marine insurance industry with 
specific reference to the structural changes in the mutual P&I Clubs. The marine 
insurance industry as a service industry is subject to pressures sometimes under estimated 
but they exist and they are increasing. The impact of such changes specially the changes 
in the general insurance industry that has influence on the mutual clubs in the marine 
insurance industry is examined. Recently, the mutual P&I clubs has witnessed the 
pressure of a review by the European Commission of International Group Agreement and 
competition from fixed premium providers. The mutual clubs are responding to these 
challenges by providing range of services including one-stop- shop service through Joint 
ventures or alliances with the corporate players. The development of information 
technology, the commoditisation of insurance services and competition by products on 
the basis of price rather than historical relationships are undermining the insurance 
relationship, which continues to be at the heart of the most marine mutual insurers. The 
above aspect raises the question on the survival of concept of mutuality. The concluding 
chapter analyses the impact of various factors which influences the demtualisation of 
mutual clubs such as cash flow, free reserves, access to capital, size of the insurer, 
management and administrative expenses, underwriting losses, rate of investment income 
and ratings from specialised rating agencies. Analysis of results show that the P&I clubs 
Skuld and Steamship mutual have strong tendency towards demutualisation, the clubs 
London and Japan have a weak tendency towards structural changes and the other clubs 
are favourably positioned towards structural changes. The recommendations emphasise 
the challenges and trends and the need for reorientation of mutual clubs. 
KEYWORDS: Marine insurance, Demutualisation, Structural changes, P&I clubs, Fixed 
premium providers 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As the marine insurance companies stand on the brink of a new millennium they are 
facing tougher competition than would have seemed possible a few decades ago. And 
the state of the marine insurance industry today is the direct result of the incredible 
transformation of the overall financial services industry and in particular the general 
insurance industry. Over the past 20 years staggering changes have taken place in the 
global general insurance environment. Companies in the insurance industry are currently 
facing a number of challenges and trends inter-alia globalisation of markets, 
consolidation and specialisation, increased competition from new competitors, new 
products and alternative distribution channels, changes in customer needs, changes in the 
security perception of vessel operation, reducing margins and increasing costs, 
increasing sophistication and complexity of information technology including e-
commerce and increased risk requiring innovative risk transfer vehicles. (Geib Gerd, 
2001.p.1) 
 
1.1 Do these changes in the general insurance industry create any impact in the 
marine insurance industry? 
                 
Shipping being a specialised industry has so far insulated itself from the developments 
that have been taking place in the general insurance industry. The new entrants into the 
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marine insurance market have taken knowledge from other industries and applied it to 
the marine sector. This includes knowledge on customer behaviour, distribution, brands, 
perception and service. The brand values of mutual clubs, which relied on shipowner’s 
trust and reliability, which seemed to belong to the marine insurance industry for so long, 
are no longer enough to provide sustainable competitive advantage for the traditional 
players. Thus the changes that are taking place in the general insurance industry are 
relevant to shipping. Shipping is an international industry subject to unique 
environmental, political, and commercial considerations. Marine insurance as a service 
industry, which exists to provide the ship owner the cover that he needs has to operate 
on a global basis and is subject to all pressures sometimes under- estimated but they 
exist and they are increasing (Taylor, 2000.p.22).   
 
The events of the past few years, the review by the European Commission (EC) of the 
International Group Agreement (IGA), the decision to limit the amount of cover under 
P&I by the mutual clubs and the incredible interest in P&I shown by commercial 
insurers have sparked considerable debate about the functioning of mutual clubs. In June 
1999 the DGIV of the EC granted a ten-year exemption to the IGA until February 2009 
subject to the condition that there should be competition among clubs who are members 
of the IGA and all the clubs should publish their Average Expense Ratios. With the 
increasing transparency and changes in the reporting standards consequent to the EC 
investigation, S&P developed a full rating process for the P&I clubs and many clubs 
voluntarily opted for interactive ratings (made with the cooperation of the insurer) which 
was first published in 1999.  The mutual clubs went through a process of review that 
resulted in the merger of the Liverpool & London and Newcastle Club with North of 
England Club and the demutualisation of British Marine Mutual, London. The mutual 
clubs also started examining their weaknesses in comparison to the commercial insurers, 
namely the unbudgeted supplementary calls. Consequently the UK Club announced a 
new reinsurance arrangement with Swiss Re designed to support it’s solvency position 
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without the need for unbudgeted calls, which is the new trend evolving among other 
mutual clubs (Sydenham, 2000.pp.4-5).  
 
1.2 What is the impact of the entry of fixed premium providers in P&I? 
 
The other development that has been noticed in recent years is the increased retention of 
risk by the clubs both individually and collectively through the group pool system. The 
group clubs have repeatedly indicated their readiness to increase the pool’s retention of 
risk should reinsurance rates rise and it is a major benefit of the pool and it’s spread of 
risk that the clubs have this flexibility. The S&P report identified that the major issues 
facing the marine mutual insurance market is consolidation, diversification and 
demutualisation. If consolidation of mutual clubs takes place the International Group 
could end up with far fewer members resulting in lack of choice for the shipowners, 
which may drive more business to the fixed premium market. The mutual clubs are 
combating the threats from the fixed premium competitors by providing a range of 
services through joint ventures or alliances with the corporate players. This may pose a 
danger to the clubs since the corporate players who are entering into joint ventures may 
desire to have a firm hold on the mutual clubs affecting their freedom and possibly 
resulting in a take over.  
 
1.3 Impact of information technology 
 
The impact of technological development, especially information technology, on the 
insurance industry is phenomenal. Delivery systems for insurance products have become 
much more sophisticated. In contrast to the personal one to one approach of brokers with 
underwriters nowadays the shipowners have direct access to information on availability 
of insurance cover and terms and conditions of cover from all over the world and decide 
on the insurer who is best suited to the interest of the shipowners. The major 
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disadvantage in such a system would be testing the reliability of the insurer but looking 
into the credit ratings given by the reputed credit rating agencies can solve this tricky 
issue. The technological development, therefore, constitutes a direct attack on the 
relationship insurance, which continues to be at the heart of the most marine mutual 
insurers. The technology therefore contributes to the commoditisation of insurance 
services, which in turn encourages competition by products on the basis of price rather 
than historical relationships. The individual shipowners who are members of the mutual 
club are aware of the alternatives and they may refuse to cross-subsidise other members 
of the mutual clubs who contribute less to the bottom line (Wilderman, 2001. pp.2-5) 
 
1.4 Emerging force in marine insurance industry –E-commerce 
 
Another area where competition seems set to increase is electronic payments processing 
and provision of insurance services over the Internet. This is a global phenomenon that 
will certainly affect the marine mutual industry. Non- financial firms which means the 
non-marine insurance providers, who control communication networks and the gateways 
could set themselves up as brokers directing customers to the best product. (Brinson, 
2000. p.15). The loyalty of the customer would increasingly be to the broker rather than 
the producer of the product or the one who actually provides the insurance service. What 
is the immediate impact of such a development? At the very least this process will 
squeeze the margins of traditional insurance providers. It is also highly likely that there 
are non-financial firms offering such services who would be in a position to design a 
new product by using the information available to them through data mining technology. 
Whether such a product will start competing with the traditional product offered by 
segmented insurance service providers is important. Let us say a popular web portal can 
offer an integrated service of P&I, Hull, Cargo and FD&D cover from various insurers 
by combining the best, which meet the specific needs of the shipowners and call it new 
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product. In such a case the brand value of the original segmented product, namely the 
insurer of P&I or Hull or cargo loses it’s importance.       
 
1.5 Is there any trend towards demutualisation of mutual clubs?  
 
The world wide insurance industry was dominated by mutuals only a decade ago. Since 
then there has been a trend towards demutualisation, which saw many mutual insurance 
companies in the life insurance sector demutualising in the last decade. A report from 
Reuters (2000) observes that the mutual insurance companies reforming as joint stock 
companies may be a mistake, and the current trend to demutualise may stop, or even 
reverse. The report noted that some mutuals planning to convert to stock ownership, 
such as Metropolitan Life in the U.S., did just the reverse earlier this century, and said 
the trend may yet swing back to favour mutual ownership.  
One of the biggest reinsurers Swiss Re also said in its latest report (Sigma report, 
1999.p.34) that mutual insurers have some fundamental advantages over joint-stock 
competitors and should reconsider the decision of rushing to demutualise. The current 
trend would show up to 10 large insurers abandoning mutual status over the next three 
years. Among the big names slated to demutualise are the U.S.'s two largest life insurers, 
Prudential and Metropolitan Life, and the four largest Canadian life insurers. In the UK, 
life insurers NPI and Scottish Widows are in the process of demutualising after being 
acquired by other companies. The trend was set by Swiss Life, Norwich Union and 
AMP, which demutualised in 1997 and 1998. Sigma report said life insurers were 
demutualising to make capital access and acquisitions easier, but warned that this meant 
losing the mutual's cost advantage of having no customer-owner conflicts. The report 
observed that the mutuals, without any short-term shareholders to please have the 
advantage of flexible pricing and long-term investment. The demutuality is an option 
open to mutual clubs to expand their business and accessing capital by becoming joint 
stock companies. Demutusalisation requires significant changes to P&I club’s corporate 
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culture. A move to fixed premium inherently points to a shareholder’s interest approach 
as opposed to the mutually beneficial concept. There are considerable differences 
between the financial structure of mutual and corporate organisations. Demutualised 
clubs will no longer be able to make supplementary calls to members to cover greater 
than expected losses so they will have to back their underwriting with appropriate capital. 
The demutualised corporate entity cannot rely entirely on providing P&I insurance cover 
since this may result in a narrow business review of concentrating on one type of 
business sourced from one industry. This is primarily due to the fact that shipping being 
a cyclical industry, a slump in the shipping industry will affect the bottom line of the 
insurance business. The clubs that demutualised in the last three years were British 
Marine Mutual (BMM) providing P&I cover, Charterers’ Mutual providing cover for 
charterers and Transmarine providing cover for strike and disruption. The increasingly 
competitive nature of the P&I market might influence mutual clubs to opt for merger 
rather than demutualisation as in the case of two big P&I clubs Britannia and Standard, 
who negotiated for a merger last year, which, however, finally fell through. Mr.Todd of 
syndicate 329 observed that ‘the rush to demutualise may be pushed to one side while 
merger mania sweeps through the market. Consolidation is easier than 
demutualisation’(Beatty,1990.p.19). 
Apart from demutualisation, there are certain considerations that are driving 
merger and acquisition activity across the insurance industry for the purpose of capital 
allocation, competitive positioning and pressures for global presence. Many insurance 
companies are seeking mergers and acquisitions to gain benefits of scale and hoping that 
they benefit from lower costs, improved time to market, greater flexibility and more 
attractive positioning to investors. In this project I propose to analyse what these 
changes mean for marine insurance companies and what the industry will look like in 
the coming years.  
The topic, emerging trends in marine insurance industry - demutualisation of 
mutual clubs was chosen because it reflects author’s concern for the changes that are 
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taking place in the general insurance industry which are likely to have influence in the 
marine insurance industry. The author, having a financial and maritime administration 
background, believes that the trends in general insurance industry need to be thoroughly 
analysed for the cause that may contribute to the mutual clubs. This belief, indeed 
influences author’s decision for choosing this topic.   
Many books have been written about P&I clubs but not many have been formally 
written about emerging trends or demutualisation of mutual clubs in the marine 
insurance industry. The material that influences this work is obtained through different 
sources such as books from the WMU library, (Stephen Hazelwood, Gaskell, Phil 
Anderson, Christopher Hill, Drewry Insurance report …), texts from technical seminars, 
conferences (Mare Forum,2000, IUMI,2000… ), P&I review reports (Elysian, Marsh 
HSBC …), Personal e-mail enquiries to various P&I clubs, discussion with shipowners, 
insurance brokers and managers of insurance clubs during field visits (Greece, London, 
Bremen…), personal discussion with visiting Lecturers (Mr.Claes Lindh, Mr.Svensson, 
Dr.Harlambides…) and a variety of marine periodicals, websites and lecture notes. The 
topic is difficult, to the author of course because of the availability of limited research 
material. However, it is interesting. His passion for the subject is motivation behind this 
work.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DYNAMICS OF MARINE INSURANCE 
 
2.1 Legal regime for marine insurance 
 
The Marine insurance was practiced as the early as twelfth century by Lombards 
and the members of the Hanseatic League introduced it to England. The institution 
for providing marine insurance in the UK started with the Lloyds coffee house in 
the seventeenth century. Lloyd’s developed the standard marine policy called the 
Lloyd’s S.G (Ship &Goods) in 1779 and it remained in use until 1982.The S.G 
form is given as the sample of form of policy in the First Schedule to the Marine 
Insurance Act, 1906. During 1982 a new simplified policy document evolved 
called MAR form keeping in view the changing needs of the industry. 
(Gaskell,1987,p.500).                                                                                                                              
 
2.2 Types of Marine Insurance 
 
The most important types of insurance in the marine insurance market are Hull and 
Machinery (H&M), Protection & Indemnity (P&I), Freight, demurrage and 
defence (FD&D), War risk, and Strike insurance. The H&M covers the ship, the 
equipments on board the ship including the propulsion and auxiliary machinery, 
cargo handling and navigation equipments and similar items of plant. H&M also 
covers the ship’s contribution to general average, salvage and   ¾ th of the liability 
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to the other vessel in collision. The P&I insurance cover the ship owner against the 
third party liabilities, which are covered under other insurance policy (Wijnost and 
Wergeland, 1997.p.216). FD&D insurance provides insurance for legal costs and 
technical support and assistance to defend or prosecute a wide range of uninsured 
claims and disputes. P&I clubs offer this type of insurance as an additional class of 
insurance. The War Risks insurance provides cover if the vessel finds itself in a 
war zone or other areas of hostilities since the normal H&M and P&I insurance are 
likely to be suspended. Strike insurance covers insurance of losses, which are 
consequent to strike at the ports or during the performance of a voyage. A ship 
owner or manager usually buys cover for financial consequences of damage to his 
own ship, damage to other people’s property or death or injury to people. A 
charterer specifically a time charterer, has insurance similar to the ship owner. 
Cargo owners requirements are usually confined to loss or damage to cargo. 
 
         2.3 Application of various International conventions 
 
For the shipping industry, being international in character, the operational 
requirements of a ship in international trade are primarily governed by various 
International conventions mainly the conventions of the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO), International Labour Organisation (ILO), UNCTAD, Comite 
Maritime International (CMI) and the port state regulations where the ship is likely 
to trade. IMO is entrusted with the responsibility of maritime safety including 
prevention of pollution of the marine environment. The important conventions of 
IMO in this respect are SOLAS1974, MARPOL1973/78, STCW 1978/95, 
CLC1969/92, LLMC1976/96, FUND1971/1992, and HNS1996. These 
conventions impose certain minimum standards on the operation and maintenance 
of ships, which are important considerations for the marine insurers for the 
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efficient management of risk (Donner, 2000). The application of ISM, which has 
direct implications on marine insurance, is discussed here under. 
 
         2.3.1  Impact of Implementation of ISM code 
 
This code has come into partial operation from 1st July 1998 for certain types of 
ship and it is fully applicable from 1st July 2002 for all types of ships. The ISM 
code focuses on improving and establishing sound management standards so as to 
provide safeguards against accidents caused by errors on the part of the shipboard 
and shore management. Therefore the implementation of the ISM code has a wide 
range of implications on the parties who are connected with the operation of a ship, 
namely charterers, cargo owners, insurance companies, financiers, ship brokers, 
underwriters and the classification societies. The UK P&I club’s recently 
published study of major claims has identified the causes of such major claims 
which include deck officer error (25%), crew error (17%), equipment failure (9%), 
structural failure (9%), shore error (9%), pilot error (5%), mechanical failures (5%) 
and engineer officer error (2%) (UK P&I Club, 2000, p.19). If we look at the 
above findings we can conclude that the majority of the identified errors were 
human errors and following the safe practices laid down under the ISM code could 
minimize human error. In support of this statement, the statistics on voluntary 
compliance show a reduction of 10% in liability insurance, 7-8% in P&I premium, 
40% in lost man hours, 40% in pollution fines and the damage to container claim 
has fallen from $2million to $20,000 (Skuld, 1998) (Mary Bond, 1999). Proper 
implementation of international conventions would help in reducing the losses and 
would consequently reduce claims. In the competitive environment the mutual 
clubs are required to find ways and means of reducing their cost and any effort to 
minimize the loss would improve their bottom line. Mr. Frederick Kruse of the 
Swedish Club (The Swedish Club, 1999) in his paper presented at the P&I 
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conference 2000 in London, stated that he is of the view that the competitive 
factors in future take many forms and one of them is loss prevention. The Swedish 
club made an analysis of the impact of ISM and found that the hull claims record 
of ships subject to the ISM code’s first dateline (July, 1,1998) is some 30% better 
than that of vessels subject to the Phase II deadline (July, 1,2002).  
 
2.4  Economic aspects of the marine insurance  
 
The marine insurance market is one of the largest segments in the shipping market 
apart from shipping finance and freight. The International Trade Reports from 
WTO (WTO report, 2001) have quantified the volume of world trade for the year 
1999-2000 at 5.3 billion tonnes and the value of the trade for the year 1999-2000 
to cost US$ 5473 billion for exports and US$5729 billion for imports. The cost of 
the transportation process is estimated to be 4-5% that works out to around 
US$250 billion and of this the cost of marine insurance is estimated to be 
US$8.8.Billion. The cost of marine insurance forms an important component of 
ship operation costs (around 5 %-10% of the cost of transportation) and therefore 
the extent of the insurance cover and obtaining competitive rate for obtaining such 
cover from various service providers is important for the ship owner (Drewry, 
1998.pp.7-8). The global marine insurance market could be divided into two major 
markets, one in London and the other forming the rest of the world. The London 
marine insurance market is estimated to be around 30% of the global market due to 
the legacy inherited by London that many international insurance companies used 
to conduct their business from London. 
  The major players in the London insurance market could be divided into 
three categories, namely Lloyd’s, other insurance companies and the Mutual club 
operators. The shares of business of different markets in 1998 are as under  
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Table 1  Market share of London market(1998) (Figures in US$ billion) 
 
London market Rest of the world 
Lloyd’s 2.52 Japan 2.38 
Other companies 1.95 USA 1.26 
Mutual clubs 1.11 Other countries 6.02 
  Mutual clubs 0.70 
Total 5.58  10.36 
Percentage 30%  70% 
      Source: Modified from Drewry report on Marine Insurance, 1998(p.8). 
 
The above table clearly shows the dominance of the London market in 
marine insurance with other big markets in the USA and Japan. 
If we look at the global figures estimated for different types of marine insurance, 
the details are as follows 
 
         Table 2  Market share of different types of insurance (1998)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modified from Drewry report on Marine Insurance, 1998(p.8) 
 
The above table clearly shows that the major share of the marine insurance market 
is towards cargo insurance followed by hull and P&I cover. 
 Type of Insurance Volume(US$ bn)  Market share  
1 Marine cargo 7.27 45% 
2 Hull 4.34 27% 
3 P&I 1.68 11% 
4 Marine Liabilities 1.54 10% 
5 Marine Offshore 1.11 7% 
 Total 15.94 100% 
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In addition the share of major countries that are involved in the marine insurance is 
given below. The Table 3 shows that Japan is leading the overall marine insurance 
market with market share on premium of about 17% followed by UK. If we look at 
the sectoral analysis UK has predominant position in hull and offshore market with 
market share of about 18% and 57% respectively. In the case of marine liabilities 
market more than three fourth of the market is held by USA, UK and Norway. 
This clearly shows the declining role of UK and shift of concentration from UK 
market to Japan market.  
 
Table 3  Proportion of premium revenue in 1997 (in percentage) 
 
Country Hull Cargo  Liability Offshore Total 
Japan 14.4 22.1 2.8 2.3 17.4 
UK 18.1 7.9 23.1 57.6 14.9 
USA 7.6 9.1 31.5 12.0 10.5 
Germany 3.1 13.9 0 0 9.1 
France 10.4 8.4 2.0 8.0 8.5 
Italy 6.4 6.9 2.4 2.8 6.2 
Norway 9.0 0.7 27.4 12.5 5.6 
Netherlands 3.5 2.9 0 0 2.7 
Spain 4.0 2.5 0 0 2.6 
Australia 2.6 2.2 1.3 0.9 2.2 
Source: IUMI Report, 1999  
 
2.5 Main Players in the Marine Insurance market 
 
The oldest marine insurance market, Lloyd’s in London is not an insurer and 
individuals who operate syndicate on their own account place the insurance at 
Lloyd’s. Only Lloyd’s authorised brokers can conduct the business at Lloyd’s and 
being Lloyd’s brokers provides them the opportunity and direct access to large 
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marine underwriting activity. The International Underwriting Association (IUA) 
(IUMI, 1999) explains the importance of the London insurance market in the 
following terms. 
‘’The market includes virtually all the world's top international insurance and 
reinsurance companies, which conduct business worldwide from their London 
operations. Currently there are 108 Syndicates, about 100 insurance and 
reinsurance companies, 39 Marine Protection and Indemnity Clubs and 127 
brokers operating in the market. London writes an estimated 25% of the world's 
international reinsurance, at least 30% of marine insurance and 42% of aviation. 
Lloyd's London is the world's second largest commercial insurer and eighth largest 
reinsurer ’’. 
 During 2001, London markets have the capacity to accept premiums worth 
around £11 billion, and have licenses to trade in 64 territories around the world. 
The market has an A+ rating from Standard & Poor's.’’ 
Apart from above, there are other major organizations, which operate as 
companies, and they are classified into 3 groups (Drewry, 1998 p.20) 
1. Institute of London Underwriters (ILU) & London International Insurance 
and Reinsurance Market Organisation (LIRMA). ILU provides insurance and 
reinsurance services and LIRMA provides insurance to non-marine activities. 
ILU had 46 member companies writing hull and cargo liability insurance at 
the time of merger with LIRMA.  
2. Joint Committees: 
A number of individual syndicates, which underwrite both at Lloyd’s and 
ILU, form these committees and they play technical, educational and 
advisory roles.  
3. London Underwriting Committee (LUC) & International Union of Marine 
Underwriters (IUMI) 
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LUC has a relatively small part of the marine insurance market in London. IUMI 
acts as an association of Underwriters, who organizes annual meetings and offers a 
forum for a number of marine insurers to lobby their views and try to reach some 
consensus in the marine underwriting practice. Apart from the London markets 
there are other markets primarily for Hull in western Europe (Norway, Germany, 
Switzerland, & France) and Eastern Europe (relatively small). A significant 
portion of the marine insurance market is operated by the Mutual insurers who 
provide insurance for P&I, Hull and Transport (ISL, 2000.pp.7-15). 
 
2.6 Cost of marine insurance on the ship operational cost 
 
The marine insurance cost forms approximately 5-10% of the operational cost of a 
ship. The cost of Hull and P&I insurance vary from ship to ship depending on the 
reputation and experience of owner or manager, claims record, size of fleet, 
voyage pattern, nature of cargo, type of vessels, value of the vessel, flag, year of 
build, tonnage, main machinery, class, compliance with international conventions 
namely ISM, OPA90, CLC, HNS…etc and nationality of crew (Drewry, 1998 
pp.74-76). The cargo insurers and insurers of marine liabilities also seek similar 
information but with special emphasis on cargo details. The indicative ship 
insurance cost obtained by M/S Ensign Marine Consultancy Ltd for the year 1998 
is given in Table 4. 
 
Table 4  Indicative Ship Insurance Cost (in US$) 
 
VESSEL TYPE DECLARED 
VALUE 
HULL/IV WAR 
RISKS 
P&I TOTAL 
GeneralCargo(5000GT) 5,000,000 40,000 2,500 25,000 67,500 
Reefer(9000GT) 18,000,000 92,000 9,000 40,000 141,000 
Ro-Ro(15,000GT) 12,000,000 70,000 6,000 45,000 121,000 
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LPG/LNG(30,000GT) 50,000,000 1,75,000 20,000 50,000 245,000 
Bulk (35,000GT) 15,000,000 70,000 7,500 60,000 137,500 
Container(50,000GT) 80,000,000 250,000 30,000 75,000 355,000 
Tanker(100,000GT) 60,000,000 150,000 22,500 90,000 262,500 
Passenger(60,000GT) 200,000,000 500,000 60,000 250,000 810,000 
 
Source: Modified from Drewry report on Marine Insurance, 1998(p.8) 
  
The analysis of the figures shows that there is a wide variation in insurance cost 
depending on type of ships namely the passenger ships, tankers, LPG/LNG vessels 
and container vessels having higher cost for insurance in comparison to general 
cargo and bulk carriers. The figures in the table depend on following assumptions 
1. Reputable manager and flag 
2. Vessels are not singleton but part of large entity 
3. Classed with IACS member 
4.  Less than 15 years old, well maintained and recently surveyed 
5. ITC clauses include ¾ RDC with Hull and ¼ RDC with P&I 
6. Increased value and disbursements about 10% of Hull value 
7. Values in US$ 
The cost of insurance varies depending on the following factors. In the case of a 
20-year-old vessel the insurance cost may go up by 20%. Similarly, if the vessel 
insured were singleton the cost would be up by 10%. The claims record also 
influences the cost of insurance varying from 5% to 60% depending on the level 
above break-even loss ratio. 
 
2.7  Analysis of data of various types of claims and identifying major risk 
areas in the operation of ships 
The UK P&I club in their report on the analysis of major claims for the period  
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1987 to 1997 identified the following principal risk groups by value of claims 
 
Table 5   Principal risk groups by value of claims 
 
Nature of claim Share (in terms of 
value) 
Cargo 26% 
Personal injury crew 13% 
P&I Non crew 7% 
Pollution 19% 
Property damage 16% 
Collision 10% 
Others 9% 
Source: UK P&I Club (2000.p.93) 
 
From the above it may be seen that the cargo claims constitute the largest major 
share of claims followed by claims for pollution damage and property damage.The 
above analysis also identified the factors namely deck officer error (30%), 
structural failure (20%), shore personnel error (15%), equipment failure (10%) and 
Others (25%) as the major causes of damage.The above findings clearly show that 
the majority of the insurance claims occur due to human error, which could be 
minimized by following safe practices on board ship. The implementation of ISM 
and STCW in true spirit will greatly help in reducing such claims, which will be 
beneficial to both shipowners and insurers in minimizing the cost of insurance.The 
above analysis by the UK P&I Club (UK P&I Club, 2000.pp.1-93) also provides 
the following trends in respect of insurance claims 
1. The number of claims is declining but the average value per claim has been 
showing an increasing trend. 
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2. The incidence of major cargo claims is declining. However on the other hand 
the average value per claim is increasing. 
3. Similarly the numbers of pollution incidents are declining but their average 
value is far higher than the general average value of a claim since the 
pollution claims are expensive. 
4. The number of third party claims and personal injury claims also follow the 
above trend and their average value is showing an increasing trend. Among 
the personal injury claims the study reveals that the crew error injury claims 
are much smaller than the non-crew injury claims viz. passengers, pilots, 
stevedorers and other third parties.    
The above findings clearly establish that in future the claims, even though fewer in 
number are going to be substantial in value terms, which is a major concern to the 
insurers. The insurers should find ways and means to avoid major claims, which 
have a direct impact on their profitability and the cost of insurance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MUTUAL INSURERS IN THE MARINE MARKET 
 
3.1 Background of the concept of mutual insurance  
 
The concept of mutuality for sharing the risk existed among the tribes in the early 
civilizations of China, India, Babylon and Egypt. The formation of societies, 
guilds, clubs and associations during the Greek and Roman civilizations 
established the concept of mutuality for sharing the risks. The concept of mutuality 
in marine insurance originated in UK with the formation of hull clubs in the early 
part of the 18th century to guard against exorbitant insurance premia charged by the 
monopolistic companies established by virtue of the Bubble Act of 1720 (UK).  
Even though the Bubble Act restricted the operation of partnerships for insuring 
marine risks, the mutual clubs operated as associations, which were considered to 
be different from the partnership. (Hazelwood, 2000 p.2). The repeal of the Bubble 
Act, 1720 (as amended in 1824) and the introduction of the Companies Act in 
1862(UK) provided the legal framework for the operation of mutual clubs.  
 
 The mutual clubs for P&I insurance evolved in the mid 19th century on the 
lines of mutual hull clubs, which had been in existence since the beginning of 
eighteenth century. The necessity for P&I mutual clubs arose to meet the growing 
needs of the shipowners who needed protection against the liabilities for loss of 
life and personal injury under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 and also the risks 
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not covered by the ordinary marine insurance. The number of collision accidents 
also increased in number raising the concern of the shipowners. The Lloyds 
statistical committee studied the reason for increase in the collision claims and 
they gave findings that the number of collisions at sea increased after the 
introduction of steamers. (Young, 1995, p.4). Traditionally the shipowner’s 
liabilities were restricted to the value of the ship and freight and the liabilities, 
which were in excess of them needed cover as in the case of one fourth of the 
collision liabilities, which were not covered by the London under writers under the 
Running Down Clause (RDC).  
 
         Table 6 THE IGA CLUBS 
 
NAME OF THE CLUB LOCATION SHORT NAME 
1. American   Steamship Owners Mutual P&I 
Association. Inc 
New York American Club 
2. Assurance Foreningen Gard Oslo Gard 
3. Assurance Foreningen Skuld Oslo Skuld 
4. The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association 
Limited 
London Britannia Club 
5. The Japan Shipowners Mutual P&I Association Tokyo Japan Club 
6. The London Steamship Owners Mutual Insurance 
Association Ltd 
London London Club 
7. *The North Of England P&I Association New Castle N Of E Club 
8. The Shipowners Mutual P&I Association  London Shipowners Club 
9. The Standard Steamship Owners P&I Association 
Ltd 
London Standard Club 
10. The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association 
(Bermuda) Ltd 
London Steamship Mutual 
11 Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening Gothenburg Swedish Club 
12. The United Kingdom Mutual Steamship Assurance 
Association (Bermuda) Ltd 
London UK Club 
13. The West Of England Shipowners Mutual 
Insurance Association (Luxembourg) 
London W Of E Club 
   *Merged with the New Castle P&I association  & Liverpool & London club 
Source: Drewry Report on Marine Insurance,1998.p.47. 
 
The first mutual liabilities company the Shipowners’ Mutual Protection Society  
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was established in 1855. This was followed by the other associations who also started 
offering P&I cover to their members. The members shared the risks of claims in 
proportion to the tonnage of their ship. The concept of P&I expanded when the 
shipowners required an indemnity for loss or damage to cargo when they were made 
liable under the Act as in the case of ‘Western Hope’. There are about 16 mutual clubs 
in existence out of which 13 are members of International club Group Agreement (IGA) 
and the rest are non-IGA members. (Drewry, 1998.p.47). The list of clubs who are 
members of the IGA may be seen above. The list of P&I insurers who are not members 
of IGA are given below 
  
      Table 7 The Non-IGA P&I  Insurers 
 
Name Location Fixed/ 
Mutual 
1 British Marine Mutual Association 
Limited  
London Mutual* 
2. The Charterers Mutual Assurance 
Association Limited 
London Mutual* 
3. Deutche Versicherungs-Und 
Ruckversicherungs –AG(Darag) With 
Gerling –Konzern AG 
Rostock Fixed 
4. Dragon Protection And Indemnity London Fixed 
5. HIH Marine Insurance Services London Fixed 
6. Lloyds And Companies (Various Markets) London Fixed 
7. Ocean Marine Mutual P&I Association 
Limited 
Brussels Mutual* 
8. Osprey Underwriting Agency London Fixed 
9. Southern Seas Agencies Limited Florida Fixed 
10. Terranova Insurance Company Limited London Fixed 
Source: Drewry Report on Marine Insurance, 1998 p.47. 
* Demutualised in 1998 & 1999 and have become fixed premium operator. 
3.2 Sharing of risk in mutual Club 
 
The arrangement of sharing the risk for members in the clubs who are members of 
IGA is shown in Table 8 (Anderson, 1999.pp.30-34). 
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1. Retention: The members of the pooling arrangement each bear their own 
claims up to a maximum of US$ 5 million for each claim. 
2. Pooling agreement: Claims in excess of retention and up to US$30 million are 
shared by pooling in accordance with a percentage contribution allocated to 
each club which is worked out based on premium income, entered tonnage and 
pool recovery record.  
3. Excess reinsurance contract: In order to reduce the possibility of unexpected 
calls on members the clubs developed a system of reinsurance and clubs used 
to pool their claims for reinsurance in excess of a specified figure. This 
arrangement helped sharing of heavy claims made against one club by other 
members of the other clubs who are under the reinsurance pooling arrangement. 
The first pooling agreement was concluded among 6 clubs based in London in 
1899 called the London Group, which later became the International Group.  
 
Table 8. Development of General excess of loss insurance limits and costs (in US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Drewry Report on Marine Insurance, 1998.p.67 
 
Year Club retention 
 
Pool retention Limit 
 
Cost per GT 
Tankers 
Cost per GT
Dry Cargo 
1989 1,200.000 12,000,000 1,250,000,000 0.3165 0.1585 
1990 1,600,000 12,000,000 1,250,000,000 0.4366 0.1789 
1991 1,600,000 12,000,000 1,250,000,000 0.5722 0.2132 
1992 2,000,000 15,000,000 1,050,000,000 1.3985 0.4062 
1993 3,000,000 25,000,000 1,050,000,000 1.3873 0.3980 
1994 4,000,000 30,000,000 1,180,000,000 1.4367 0.4214 
1995 5,000,000 30,000,000 1,530,000,000 1.4367 0.4214 
1996 5,000,000 30,000,000 1,500,000,000 1.2346 0.3061 
1997 5,000,000 30,000,000 2,030,000,000 0.6786 0.2357 
1998 5,000,000 30,000,000 2030,000,000 0.5479 0.1957 
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Claims in excess of US$ 30 million and up to a maximum of US$ 500 million 
(now raised to US$1 billion) for pollution claims and US$ 2 billion per claim 
for other categories are covered by this reinsurance contract. The clubs also 
share the reinsurance premium according to the tonnage entered in the club. 
The rates vary according to the type of the tonnage with the oil tankers having 
the highest rates per ton compared to bulk.  
4. Overspill claims layer: The P&I clubs operated with unlimited liability till 
recently but in 1996 a decision was made to introduce an upper limit based on 
a percentage (2.5%) of the tonnage limitation figure (Article 6(1)(b) of 
Limitation of Liability on Maritime Claims,1976 (LLMC,1976 convention) of 
all the vessels entered in all the International Group clubs. In 1999 this amount 
is estimated at US$ 4.25 billion.  
The development of general excess of loss reinsurance limits and costs may be 
seen in Table above, which shows that the club retention has increased from 
US$1.2 million in 1989 to US$ 5 million in 2001 and the pool retention also 
increased from US12 million in 1989 to US$ 30 million at present. The overall 
limit for reinsurance also has increased from US$1.25 billion to US$2.03.billion.  
The trend over the years has been one of gradual increase in the retention limit on 
individual clubs and the pooling limit.  
 
3.3 Legal Status of operation of mutual clubs 
 
Most of the P&I mutual clubs are registered under the Companies Act relevant to 
their jurisdiction as mutual benefit societies without share capital. (Hazelwood, 
2000, p.13). The P&I associations in UK are registered under the Companies Act 
as registered companies limited by guarantee with no share capital. Their members 
are not shareholders since they do not subscribe to capital or share any profits. In 
the relationship between the members and their club the overriding obligation is 
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the mutual responsibility. The members contribute to the damages suffered by 
other members by virtue of the obligations provided under the Articles of 
Association and Rules of the club, which guarantee each other’s claims. This 
arrangement works as network of reciprocal guarantees and it explains the non-
profit making nature of the clubs. The relationship between the members and their 
club is laid down in the Articles of Association, which provide for the governance 
of the club by the board of directors elected at the general body meetings and the 
directors are bound to conduct the business as stipulated in the Articles of 
Association. The Articles of Association also cover matters relating to the 
qualification for entry into the club, termination and withdrawal of membership, 
right to protection and indemnity, liability to contribute in the case winding up and 
to pay the calls of the club. In most clubs the directors meet at regular intervals 
every two or three months to decide on matters of general policy and to consider 
the claims that require their approval. (Hazelwood, 2000, p.14)  Many of the P&I 
clubs in the UK have transferred their residences abroad and maintain registered 
offices offshore. The clubs in the UK moved to offshore destinations not only to 
obtain exemption from tax on investment income but also to guard against the 
exchange rate fluctuations of the pound sterling since the companies registered in 
the UK are bound to maintain their investments in sterling pounds that devalued 
by more than 14% against the US Dollar in 1967 (Drewry, 1998). The matter of 
fluctuation in currencies was important since most of the members of the mutual 
clubs in the UK were non-British and the clubs were required to pay a large 
proportion of their claims in currencies other than sterling. The offshore clubs 
provided a cushion against the effects of devaluation, inflation fluctuation of 
exchange rates and the burden of UK investment taxation (Hazelwood, 2000, p.18). 
 
3.4 Management of P&I clubs 
Nowadays the management of the P&I clubs is carried out by separate specialist 
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legal entities either limited companies or partnerships who work for fee, based on 
the entered tonnage, or by charging working expenses and salaries of their 
employees. The management company normally carries out the day-to-day 
administration of the club and the claims handling service. The managers are 
responsible for the collection of calls, appointment of correspondents, claims 
handling, underwriting, investments, signing policies, payment of claims and 
maintenance of records and accounts.  The powers of the managers are provided in 
the Articles of Association of the club and the managers are authorized to enter 
into contracts on behalf of the club. Many P&I clubs also have a network of 
correspondents all over the world who assist the members of the club in dealing 
with the claims. These correspondents act as service providers of the club on a 
consultancy basis and they also conduct investigations on behalf of the club for 
processing the claims (Hazelwood, 2000, p.23). 
 
3.5 Basis of operation of various players in the mutual insurance 
  
3.5.1 Insurers 
The mutual market mainly consists of insurers who deal directly with the 
shipowners or their brokers. The underwriters calculate the size of the call based 
on the following factors 
• Member’s claims within the club’s own retention 
• Contribution to pool claims 
• Proportion of the excess reinsurance premium 
• Management expenses 
• Investments 
The underwriter works out the rate for the Estimated Total Call (ETC) by using the 
following formula: 
Estimated Total Call   =   Basic Rate  * Contributing or Entered Tonnage  
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The basic rate represents the rate of premium assessed by the underwriter based on 
the information collected by him. The club directors determine the proportion of 
Advance Call, which is normally payable in two or more instalments throughout 
the year. Apart from the above the clubs which are members of the international 
group make provision in their rules for catastrophic claims or overspill claims and 
these claims are incurred by the members of the club towards the claims of other 
clubs in the group under the International Group Pooling Agreement (Hazelwood, 
2000). 
 
3.5.2 Role of agents and brokers  
 
The intermediaries such as agents and brokers play a key role in the negotiation 
and formation of marine insurance contracts. This practice started since the 
beginning of Lloyd's Coffee House, which specialized in the marine insurance 
market. The distinctive three-sided nature of marine insurance is that two 
commercial parties, insurer and insured deal with one another through the medium 
of a third, the broker. Brokers have always served as the intermediary between 
insurer and insured, even when both parties are commercial entities that would be 
quite capable of finding and negotiating with one another without assistance. From 
the very beginning, when "office-keepers" were often traders and insurers 
themselves, the broker has been in a uniquely independent position, with strong 
legal and commercial links to both sides of the insurance contract. In contrast, an 
insurance agent is more closely associated with one side of the insurance contract, 
usually the insurers. The difference between an agent and a broker was explained 
as follows by Lush J in Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd v Brennans 
(Horsham) Pty Ltd:  
     ‘’[N]either of these is a term of precision but the broad distinction is between a 
person, firm or company which carries on an independent business of placing 
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insurance upon the instructions of clients and whose basic relationship of agency is 
with the client, and the insurer's agent whose function is to procure persons to 
insure with his principal, the insurer, and whose basic relationship of agency is 
therefore with the insurer.  In short, a broker usually acts for the insured and an 
agent usually acts for the insurer’’. (Hazelwood, 2000,p.45)                                      
 
3.5.3 Reinsurance  
 
Reinsurance is an arrangement between insurance companies, wherein one 
company (the ceding company) cedes a portion of a risk (policy, premium, and 
losses) to the other insurance company (the assuming company or reinsurer). 
Therefore the risk of loss is spread and a disproportionately large loss under a 
single policy does not fall on one company.  Reinsurers can be other insurance 
companies or companies specializing in reinsurance only. (Hazelwood, 2000,p.110) 
There are two types of reinsurance: 
1.Facultative - reinsurance of one particular risk (policy) where the reinsurer 
retains the right (faculty) to accept or reject each risk offered by the ceding 
company.  
2.Treaty - reinsurance (usually written on an annual basis) of an entire class of 
business consisting of many policies, where the ceding company agrees to cede 
and the reinsurer agrees to assume all of the risks (policies) of a particular class of 
business. 
When a ceding company places either facultative or treaty reinsurance, the 
reinsurance is usually placed on one of the following bases: 
• Pro-rata or Quota share – reinsurance: The reinsurer shares a pro rata portion 
of the premium and losses of the ceding company on a fixed percentage basis; 
e.g. 25%, 30%, or some other percentage. 
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• Excess of Loss Reinsurance: The reinsurer (subject to a specified limit) pays 
100% of the losses of the ceding company in excess of a certain agreed limit 
(e.g. $30,000,000 retention) either on a per risk basis or in excess of a certain 
aggregate of all losses of a particular type (e.g. $10,000,000 for windstorm 
losses). It includes various kinds of reinsurance: catastrophe, per risk, per 
occurrence, and aggregate excess of loss (Hazelwood, 2000). 
In the case of P&I, the International Group of clubs arranges excess loss 
reinsurance in the market on behalf of the individual member clubs. The Drewry 
Report on Marine Insurance (Drewry, 1998.pp.67-68) states that since 1994 the 
excess loss reinsurance cut in at $30 million for each claim and the gradual trend 
has been for the P&I clubs to take a greater share of the risk at the lower end and 
to extend reinsurance to higher levels at the top end. The above report observed 
that the shipowners are critical of the reinsurance programme since over the past 
20 years only three cases have shown losses to reinsurance underwriters namely 
Amoco Cadiz (1979) and Exxon Valdez (1989) and the reinsurance premium was 
as high as US$360 Million in 1994. 
 
3.6 Marine risks covered by P&I Clubs under Club rules 
 
There are two principal forms of insurance covered under P&I namely liability 
insurance, which places an obligation on the insurer to pay any damages which the 
assured is likely to pay as a result of occurrences which are defined in his 
insurance cover, and indemnity insurance, which places an obligation upon an 
insurer to reimburse or indemnify an assured only to the extent that the assured has 
incurred and discharged his liability. The insurers duty to indemnify does not arise 
until the assured has paid damages to the third party. It is not necessary for a 
member to have cover against all of the risks covered in a club’s rules and each 
member may negotiate which risks he wishes to have covered and whether he 
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wishes to bear deductibles in respect of any such risk. The risks normally covered 
are given in the P&I rule book  (Hazelwood, 2000, p.153). The information on 
coverage of risks would clearly show that the shipowner with full P&I cover is 
insured against all the liabilities from catastrophic oil spills, costly collision and 
staggering loss of life to feeding stowaways, compensating passengers for loss of 
luggage and bailing out drunken crew members from local gaols. (Hazelwood, 
2000, p.153) 
 
 3.7  Current problems in the mutual insurance market 
 
The major challenges faced by the mutual clubs could be classified as under 
 3.7.1  Losses 
1. Underwriting losses 
2. Increase in claims –increase in deficit –falling reserves 
3. Increase in administrative cost 
 
 3.7.2  Relevance of concept of mutuality – survival of pooling agreement 
 
 A. Bilbrough & Co who are managers of the London P&I club (Edminston, 2001) 
were of the view that the group unity is important for collective financial strength 
and maximum financial security for about 87% of the World’s merchant fleet. The 
International Group has real assets totalling about US$6billion to meet claims and 
free reserves totalling about US$2 billion. The other advantage of the group 
system is that the group has the largest reinsurance contract placed in the Lloyd’s 
market that provides them the power to negotiate better rates. The system of club 
letters of undertaking has wide acceptance and the group clubs do not default on 
the payment of the claims.  
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          3.7.3  Competition within the IGA 
 
 Consequent to the investigation by European Commission (EC) and amendment 
carried out by the IGA the clubs are allowed to freely quote their rates net of 
management cost so that the competing clubs will have to match them in full. This 
arrangement forces the clubs to cover their management cost out of their 
investment income. This will also facilitate shipowners to enter their fleets in more 
than one club and each of his clubs becomes a holding club and they can quote 
freely on any of the new purchases of the shipowner. However, the major factor 
which discourages the shipowner moving from one club to another is the release 
call charged by the clubs to release a member, which is supposed to cover the 
liability for future supplementary calls ( Edminston, 2001). 
 
       3.7.4   Competition from fixed premium insurers 
 
 The entry of fixed premium insurers in the recent years has triggered certain 
changes in the P&I mutual market. 
• Fall in the rates of insurance premium 
• Reduction in average expense ratio of mutual clubs 
• Reduction in supplementary calls 
• Improvement in quality of service 
 However, the fixed premium insurers are small and offer no apparent advantage 
other than the certainty that the clients will not have to pay supplementary calls. 
The following fixed players have entered the market and some of them have the 
backing of big players. 
1. HIH - an Australian insurer (Collapsed recently) 
2. Dragon –formed by a manager of mutuals 
3. Terra Nova – a Bermuda based insurer 
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4. Southern seas – backed by a American insurer 
5. AXA - established big player in France 
6. British Marine – Based in London  
 
 3.7.5  Changing needs of ship owners - One- stop-shop service 
 
The one-stop-shop service means that one club or company that would cover the 
comprehensive insurance needs of the shipowners by providing a wide variety of 
insurance cover. Phil Mitchell of the United Insurance brokers is of the view that 
the ‘’mutual market is moving towards the concept of ‘one stop shop’’, offering 
multiple products to suit the customer’s insurance requirements. He pointed out 
some recent developments like Thomas Millers & Company Limited, the 
managers of the UK P&I club who have worked out a strategic alliance with Swiss 
Re and they have positioned themselves similar to Tindall Riley to offer a multiple 
product insurance service. The other mutual clubs also follow a similar approach 
as in the case of the Steamship Mutual, which provides cover for cargo operators, 
transporters, ports and harbours and tugs. The Gard Club provides administrative 
services for insuring all marine and energy risks. The Swedish Club already 
offered Hull, P&I and associated risk covers for many years. The North of 
England Club also runs a hull mutual service. The Standard Club is also expected 
to move in the same direction (Mitchell1, 2001).    
  
3.7.6 Investigation by regulatory authorities on the practices 
 
 The European Commission (EC) considered the procedure forbidding the 
International Group clubs from quoting a rate lower than that of a holding club as 
                                                 
1 Personal E-mail received from Mr. Phil Mitchell, United Insurance Brokers, London 
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a restriction on freedom of competition and thereby violating the relevant 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome.  The European Commission also investigated 
the value of the group pooling system and the need for rating under the 
International Group Agreement (IGA). The previous limit on cover of US$20 
billion was also considered by the EC to be too high. After several rounds of 
negotiations the International Group (IG) Clubs had with the EC and certain 
amendments made to the IGA, the EC granted a ten-year exemption from 
European competition laws with effect from 20-2-1999. The previous exemption 
from the EC expired in 1995.The European Commission finally approved the IGA 
subject to two conditions that clubs will publish within their annual financial 
statements their Average Expense Ratios, being the average of their management 
expenses (excluding claims) as a proportion of the premium and investment 
income over the last five years. The other condition is that there should be free 
competition between clubs in terms of rating business in so far the rating relates to 
management costs. (Crichton , 2000) 
 
 3.8  Emerging trends in the mutual insurance  
 
 3.8.1    Mergers, Alliances and Acquisitions 
  Similar to the shipping industry, which in recent years has been moving 
towards consolidation with mergers, acquisitions and alliances, the international 
insurance market is also heading towards market consolidation or polarisation. The 
following consolidations in the international insurance industry have given some 
major players a chance to increase their corporate power and diversify into new 
fields including marine insurance. (Drewry, 1998.p.57) 
1. Royal Insurance and Sun Alliance Insurance of the UK 
2. AXA and UAP of France 
3. Allianz and AGF of Germany/France 
 33
4. AGF and RNV of France and the Netherlands 
5. ING and BBL of the Netherlands. 
6. Credit Suisse and Winterthur of Switzerland. 
7. General Accident and Commercial Union of UK 
8. Eagle Star and Zurich Re of UK/ Switzerland. 
9. Exel and MidOcean Reinsurance of Bermuda (reinsurance company) 
The summary of consolidation of mutual clubs market is given below. 
 
Table 9 Consolidation of players in Mutual marine insurance  
Name of the Club Alliance Partner 
1. American   Steamship Owners Mutual P&I 
Association. Inc 
MOU with American Hull insurance Syndicate 
for mutual cooperation & Support on cover, 
service and capabilities 
2. Assurance Foreningen Gard Sub contracted the management to a new 
company Gard Services AS for the joint 
marketing of hull and P&I insurance products 
3. Assurance Foreningen Skuld Looking for alliance. Lost 2.5Million GT in 
2000 renewal. 
4. The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association 
Limited 
Tindall Riley the managers of this club have 
sold their entity to Allianz AGF MAT to offer 
multi product service including hull insurance.  
5. Liverpool And London Steamship P&I 
Association Limited 
Merger arrangement with North of England to 
transfer 5 Million GT. 
6. The North Of England Protecting &Indemnity 
Association 
Offer hull insurance through MSMI. Merger 
arrangement with Liverpool and London to 
acquire 5 Million GT 
7. The Standard Steamship Owners P&I Association 
Ltd  
Agreement with Tokyo marine & Fire 
Insurance company to provide P&I cover to 
Japanese shipowners.   
8. Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening Offer both Hull and P&I cover  
9. The United Kingdom Mutual Steamship 
Assurance Association (Bermuda) Ltd 
Reinsurance programme with Swiss Re to 
protect the club’s free reserves to avoid the 
additional calls. Thomas miller the mangers of 
the UK club offer hull product Dex through 
Swiss Re 
Source: Compilation of data from P&I review 2000 of HSBC, Elysian Insurance services and Marsh.  
 
 The above trend of consolidation among the insurance companies triggered a chain 
reaction of consolidation among broking houses. The number of Lloyd’s brokers 
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has reduced from 272 in 1983 to 206 in 2000.The Lloyd’s syndicates are also 
consolidating either by leaving the market or by mergers. The syndicates 
underwriting marine business have reduced from about 146 to 46 in the last ten 
years. The P&I mutual clubs also started consolidating starting with the North of 
England and The Newcastle merger in 1998.Similar mergers of the Liverpool Club 
with the London Club and Skuld with the Swedish Club are predicted by some 
reports. The trend of consolidation of P&I clubs will result in fewer, stronger and 
more efficient clubs (Drewry, 1998.p.58). One of the views, which explains the 
necessity for consolidation of P&I clubs is that the need to disclose administrative 
costs and Average Expense Ratio of P&I clubs (consequent to the EC decision) 
might force less efficient clubs to look for mergers (Crichton, 2000). This leads us 
to the question of optimum size of the club where some experts are of the view 
that the optimum size for any P&I mutual would be around 30 million tones GT 
(Crichton, 2000). Mr. Phil Mitchell of the United Insurance Brokers also identified 
the future trend towards mergers of P&I mutual clubs as well as support of the 
clubs by the big players in the general insurance industry. He pointed out the 
following arrangements 
Allianz /AGF is buying the management of the Britannia 
Swiss Re is supporting the UK P&I club 
Munich Re has strong links with a number of other clubs 
 
3.8.2 Can the P&I mutual insurers survive? 
 
The views of the managers of the Britannia P&I club (Mitchell, 20012) is that, 
volume is vital, quality is vital, pooling is vital and mutuality is vital. But they feel 
that the pooling arrangement with other clubs might collapse under the stress of 
competition, divergent business plans and pressure of all sorts. It is also thought 
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that without the benefits of the pooling system the reinsurance is available at a 
cheaper rate up to US$2 billion. Therefore, the product of mutual clubs which 
have a pooling arrangement will be less distinguishable from that of it’s 
competitors. The Britannia Club also feel that the backing of a big insurance group 
like Allianz/AGF will help them to provide ‘one-stop-shopping’ for it’s clients by 
providing insurance cover for Hull& Machinery and associated risks, other 
transport risks, finance cover …etc. The P&I mutual clubs have survived almost 
unchanged for a century in almost every respect. The system has relied on 
stakeholder’s culture, pooling of risks, cohesion and benevolent monopoly.  
Mr. Roger Ingles3 of Elysian Insurance Services (Ingles, 2001) observes 
that the market needs a revival of either a non-IG Club or fixed alternative 
otherwise it will lose it’s vibrancy as the EC are so keen to see. Therefore, the 
competition between the clubs does exist but it is rather benign. The decay of the 
fixed alternative in such a quick frame will allow the clubs to restore their pricing 
levels to such that they may one day get closer to an underwriting profit but that 
may be 2-3 years away. The rebirth of competition may quash that even happening. 
Latest talk in the insurance sector is that the increases ranging from 10% to 20% in 
premium are expected next February 2002 when the majority of cover falls due for 
renewal. This may come as a shock to owners since they have enjoyed several 
years of unchanged or fractionally higher payments and in many case rebates of 
around 25% on ETC (Brewer, 2001.p.6). The owners appear to have little room for 
manoeuvre in choice of cover as external competition has dwindled. The provision 
of insurance at cost by the club has to be better for the owner than using a 
commercial underwriter who will have cost of capital and profit based motives. 
Reinsurance rates will continue to drive up prices unless the clubs simply self-
insure a greater amount of risk. 
                                                                                                                                                
2 Personal E-mail received from Mr. Phil Mitchell, United Insurance Brokers, London. 
3 Personal E-Mail received from Mr. Roger Ingles, Elysian Insurance Services, London. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ROLE OF FIXED PREMIUM INSURERS IN THE MARINE   
INSURANCE MARKET 
4.1 Concept of Fixed premium insurance 
 
The fixed premium insurance is a commercial insurance service provided by 
insurance companies established with the primary purpose of making profit. 
The fixed premium refers to the predetermined premium for providing the 
insurance cover based on a contract between an insurer and insured. In this 
contract the insurer retains the component of risk by charging the insured a 
fixed premium based on the expected value of losses. The risk is then either 
assumed or reinsured or hedged or securitised (or combinations of these actions) 
against the payment of premium. The risk premium is also required to 
compensate shareholders and financial investors. (Looberge, 2001). The fixed 
premium insurers provide the assured the certainty of cost. Since the 
underwriter is expected to make a profit the cost to the assured, at least in 
economic theory, would be higher than that for mutual insurance. Insurers who 
are called commercial insurers, composite insurers, fixed premium providers or 
non-mutual insurers, provide fixed premium insurance. 
 
 
 37
4.2 Basis of operation of fixed premium insurers 
 
The fixed premium segment (hereafter referred to as FP) is one of the largest 
groups in the general insurance segment which offers life and property 
insurance all over the world. The fixed premium providers (hereafter referred to 
as FPP) are one of the four major marine markets listed below. (Nixon, 1987) 
1. Stock insurance companies 
2. Lloyds associations 
3. Mutual clubs 
4.  Reciprocal or insurance exchanges 
The FP segment falls under stock insurance companies, which are incorporated 
business organisations organised as profit making ventures and owned by 
shareholders. These companies are governed by the state where the company is 
incorporated and they are obliged to satisfy the designated requirements of 
capital and reserve funds. The contracts they issue are usually written for a 
definitely stated consideration called premium. The insured receives no 
dividends from the earnings of the company. The premium charged by the 
insurance company is a fixed sum so that the insured knows exactly what his 
protection will cost. The capital, surpluses and the reserves of the company help 
to guarantee the payment of claims made by the assured and the assured cannot 
be called upon to pay additional premium amounts in the event that the losses 
are greater than anticipated. The insurer bears the risk as an entity separate and 
apart from the assured. In a stock company management and control vests with 
the stockholders. They elect the board of directors who in turn delegate the 
authority to the officers of the company. A policyholder of a stock insurer is not 
involved with the company beyond the payment or denial of indemnity when he 
suffers a loss (Nixon, 1987). 
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4.3    Responsibility of various players in the fixed premium insurance                   
4.3.1    Underwriters 
The insurance company that underwrites the policy provides an assessment of 
the FP for a particular vessel depending on various factors as in the case of 
mutual clubs. The rates of premia of FPP’s are influenced mainly by their 
performance in earlier years and reinsurance market rates since their focus is on 
profit. FPP’s work under a pressure to maximise returns before the market 
conditions favourable to them disappear. Most of the FPP’s offer limited cover 
ranging from US$100 to 500 million (Crichton, 2000). The low premium 
offered by FPP’s in comparison to mutual players may reflect low overheads 
and light weight infrastructure. The underwriters of the fixed premium 
insurance market operate through their agents who provide them the business. 
The shipowners or insured normally approach the insurers through their brokers 
who arrange the cover with the insurance company. The distinguishing feature 
of the operation of underwriters in the fixed premium market is that there is no 
direct link between the insurers and the insured and the insurer relies on the 
intermediary to finalise the policy. The intermediaries or the brokers play a 
crucial role in finalising the insurance contract. 
4.3.2  Reinsurers 
 
There is no distinction between the reinsurers in the fixed premium market and 
the mutual market. The reinsurers operate in both markets.  The reinsurers fix 
the rate for the reinsurance arrangement depending on the volume of business 
brought in by the original insurer. The bigger the volume the better the 
reinsurance rates offered by the reinsurers. The FPP purchases reinsurance from 
the reinsurance market to cover the risks over and above the deductibles 
retained by the shipowner. In comparison to the mutual club, normally the 
 39
FPP’s have no retention limit on the  insurance policy and they have limited 
capacity to purchase reinsurance since they provide P&I cover up to US$500 
million as against US$4.25 billion (US$2.03billion for reinsurance ) provided 
by the mutual club. In this respect the mutual clubs have the advantage of 
obtaining better rates for reinsurance through the pooling system where the 
reinsurance requirements of all the member clubs of the IGA are taken in one 
lot. The ability of the clubs to underwrite liability risks at competitive rates is 
based heavily on their ability to buy reinsurance on equally competitive terms. 
Following successive reductions of twenty per cent in the rates under the 
International Group Agreement reinsurance contract in 1998/99 and 1999/2000, 
the negotiations for the 2000/2001 renewal produced a contract for two years at 
a fixed price. The negotiations were held against a background of lower rates 
and with fears that the reinsurance market might harden in the coming months. 
In addition to the savings in the reinsurance premium, the limit for oil pollution 
has been increased to $1billion from $500m. Overall, the group received a 
reduction in reinsurance costs of about seven per cent.  
4.3.3    Agents 
The fixed premium insurers operate on a worldwide scale either through their 
own offices or agents. The agents canvass for the business of the insurer for a 
fee which is based on the amount of premium generated through his / her own 
effort. The agents normally work for more than one insurance company (may 
be competitors) offering multiple products to suit the needs of the customers.  
4.4 Interrelationship between the Hull market and P&I market 
 
The fixed premium providers are focussing on the P&I market due to the fact 
that the profitability in the hull market has not been encouraging due to the fall 
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in premium over the last ten years. The hull market has been suffering from a 
structurally soft market for almost a decade now with the rates being at the 
bottom due to overcapacity and fierce competition. Profits are no longer made 
and the businesses are concluded without proper risk assessment since they are 
cost driven. The hull underwriting market acts like a pure commodity market 
with underwriters having no technical expertise. (Barr, 2000 p.173). The 
underwriting losses are covered to a large extent by deductibles and reinsurance. 
The competitive market also encourages insurance for substandard ships. The 
advent of the mutual clubs assault on the hull market may be much sooner. 
Swedish Club already does, the Gard, the North of England and the UK clubs 
do to a limited degree and the Standard, the Steamship and the Britannia seem 
to be plotting an entry later this year. American Club has hooked up with AHIS 
to provide hull insurance. (Ingles, 2001) 
Similarly the entry of FPP is triggered certain changes in the liability market 
(P&I). In the last two years we have seen a trend of mergers and 
demutualisation efforts on the part of mutual P&I clubs. The end of the 
Liverpool and London Club, the Ocean Marine Mutual being put into 
provisional liquidation, and British Marine Mutual changing its status from a 
mutual insurer to a fixed premium provider are some of the developments. The 
Jonathan Jones syndicate at Lloyd's, which has built up a significant portfolio of 
P&I business, has moved into the fixed premium P&I market. According to 
Nigel Russell (2000), Director of the marine division of Lloyd's broker HSBC 
Insurance Brokers (HSBC, 2000.pp.2-7) has said, "If commercial insurers take 
a significant market share from the mutual clubs, it is very likely that the clubs 
will have to respond by offering their members a higher level of service on 
other insurances." HSBC's recently released Protection and Indemnity Review 
notes that fixed premium competition may already be manifesting itself in the 
mutual market in another way as many clubs announced that they were 
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changing their basis of calls. The reasons for these changes, says HSBC, may 
be twofold. Firstly, the idea of charging a supplementary call can be seen as a 
disadvantage in terms of the clubs' ability to compete against fixed premium 
facilities. Secondly, the rating agencies give the clubs little or no credit for their 
ability to collect supplementary calls, and indeed are very unhappy about 
supplementary calls in general. From a marketing point of view HSBC says that 
the budgeted supplementary calls are no longer popular, even though they 
might be good for owners' cash flow. In an increasingly competitive insurance 
industry, the other clubs are trying to reduce or eliminate the supplementary call 
from their bases of collecting premiums.  
4.5 Consolidation of syndicates in the Lloyd’s market 
 
The continuous trend of falling premium rates in the Hull and P&I markets as 
well as the cargo markets has an impact on the number of syndicates who 
operate in the Lloyd’s market either by closing down their business or merging 
their activity with someone else to survive in the market. The capacity trends at 
Lloyd’s also show a steady decline in the number of marine syndicates (Molck 
Ude, 2000). The results below clearly show consolidation of various syndicates 
  
  Table 10 Capacity trends at Lloyd’s market 
 
Year Capacity at Lloyd’s 
US$ millions 
Number of 
syndicates 
Total 
capacity 
1989 6738 134 15723 
1991 6139 106 16397 
1993 5615 62 13103 
1995 5615 46 15199 
1997 5550 42 15349 
1998 5690 39 15124 
1999 5840 40 14675 
   Source: IUMI, 2000 
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at Lloyd’s, who are responding to overcapacity and falls in the rates in the 
recent years. The major drop in the number of syndicates is seen for the period 
1991 to 1992 when the market turned drastically with huge losses. 
 
4.6 Comparative analysis of fixed premium insurance providers and 
mutual P&I clubs   
 
The data obtained from 13 P&I clubs and fixed premium insurers with 
reference to their structure, operation, cover, claims handling and services were 
analysed and the essential differences between the two segments are given 
below. (Gerits, 2000) 
 
Table 11 Comparison of fixed premium insurance providers and 
mutual P&I clubs 
 
 Mutual P&I Clubs (IGA) Fixed Premium Providers 
Profit Non profit making organisation Profit making organisation 
for the shareholders 
Incorporation Incorporated as mutual company 
under the companies act of the 
relevant jurisdiction 
Incorporated as commercial 
company or stock insurance 
company under the relevant 
jurisdiction 
Capital There is no share capital Share capital with 
shareholders 
Entry of 
Members/ 
Shareholders 
Membership open only to those 
who have insured their ship and 
entry into the club through strict 
process of scrutiny of the fleet and 
reputation of the shipowner or the 
management company. 
Members are shareholders 
and the shares are freely 
traded in the market. 
Premium The premium is called ‘calls’ and 
is calculated for the members 
depending on various factors. The 
amounts of calls vary depending 
on the financial performance of the 
club. 
The premium is 
predetermined depending on 
various factors but once it is 
fixed there is no more change 
depending on the financial 
performance of the insurance 
company 
Underwriting Benefit of good underwriting is Benefit of good underwriting 
 43
results passed on to the members in the 
form of reduced calls (premium) or 
returned calls (premium) 
becomes profit for the 
shareholders and the insured 
has no benefit. 
 
Control 
&Management 
Shipowners (insurers & insured) 
through their elected Board of 
Directors 
Shareholders (neither insurers 
nor insured unless they are 
share holders) 
Decision on 
Claims 
Board of Directors elected by the 
shipowners or insured 
Shipowners have no say and 
officers of the company who 
have been delegated the 
responsibility, process the 
claims. 
Coverage of 
claims 
Omnibus clause covered Well defined claims coverage 
with no omnibus provision 
Limit of cover Up to US$4.25 billion Normally up to US$500 
million 
Guarantee or 
undertaking 
for claims 
Normally ‘letters of undertaking 
‘issued by the club (IGA) (widely 
known & accepted) in case of 
arrest or detention by the claimant 
to minimize the hardship & loss to 
the member 
No established or proven 
systems except the bank 
guarantees which normally 
cause considerable delay and 
expense. 
 
 4.7 Major players in the fixed premium insurance market 
 
The major players in the fixed premium segment include British Marine, AXA 
Corporate solutions, J.L.Jones, Darag, Dragon P&I, Osprey Underwriting Agency 
Limited, Terranova Insurance Company Limited and Southern Seas Agencies Inc 
(Andersson, 2001). The major players and the volume of business handled by them 
are given below (Lingard, 2001). 
 
 Table 12 Fixed Premium Insurers in the Marine Market 
Name Limit of 
Coverage 
US $ 
million 
Target business Number 
of Vessels 
Entered 
Tonnage 
(million 
GT) 
Premium 
income 
2000(US$ 
million) 
AXA Corporate Solutions, Paris 500 Vessels upto 30000GT 300 NA NA 
British Marine, Luxembourg  500 All types of vessels 4900 3.50 26.53 
J.L.Jones & Others 500 All types of vessels 861 9.06 23.10 
Darag, Rostock, Germany 100 Containers  
(Upto 2000 TEU) 
General Cargo, Ro-Ro, 
826 2.01 16.00 
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Bulk Carriers (upto 
20000GT) 
Dragon P&I, London 500 General Cargo, 
Container, Reefer, Bulk 
Carriers and Product 
Tankers between 2000 to 
30000 GT 
NA 0.42 2.00 
The Korea Shipowner’s Mutual 
Protection &Indemnity 
Association, Seoul 
500 South Korean Operation 
of all types 
NA NA NA 
Osprey Underwriting agency 
Limited, London 
25 Small vessels including 
tugs, barges & dry cargo 
vessels  
NA NA 16.00 
Raets Insurance Group- Inter 
Coastal Ship owners’ P&I BV, 
Rotterdam 
 
500 Dry Cargo & Tankers 
carrying non persistent 
cargoes up to 10,000GT 
(Excluding USA, Trans 
Atlantic or Trans Pacific 
Voyages)  
500 NA 8.00 
Southern Seas Agencies, Inc, 
Brighton, UK 
25 
& 
500 
All types of vessels 
except Tankers and 
Passenger vessels. 
200 NA 7.25 
Terra Nova Insurance Company 
Limited, London. 
25 Domestic, Coastal and 
Short Sea trading vessels. 
3000 NA NA 
Total   10,587 14.99 98.88 
Source: Marsh P&I review, 2000(modified) 
 
The analysis of the volume of business of FPP show that they cover about 10587 
vessels with an entered tonnage of about 15 Million GT earning premium revenue 
of approximately US$98.88 million (for the period 1999-2000) (HSBC, 2000). In 
contrast the P&I mutual clubs cover about 66503 vessels with an entered tonnage 
of 558.81 Million GT earning premium (Call income) of 14.94 billion (for the 
period 1999-2000). This clearly shows that the volume of business handled by the 
FPP’s represents only about 3% of tonnage and 0.6% of the premium revenue 
handled by the mutual club insurers (Appendix A & B). Does this mean that the 
major players in the FPP do not pose any threat to the business of mutual clubs? 
Does this convey that the FPP’s could not make inroads into the share of the 
business handled by the mutual clubs? For the time being the answer to these 
questions is in affirmative till substantial market share is held by FPP’s. 
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4.8   Points for consideration by the shipowner  
 
The shipowners who are members of mutual clubs did not have any alternative till 
recently and they have been used to the mutual club culture for more than 100 
years and it is difficult for them to get convinced to switch over to any new 
arrangement of insurance until they are fully convinced of their benefits and 
advantages. The aspects that the shipowner has to look into before taking a 
decision to join a mutual or FPP will be (HSBC, 2000.p.1) 
1. Financial strength of the insurer including the size of the contingency 
reserve of the mutual club if any 
2. Supplementary call record of the mutual club versus the certainty of the 
fixed premium as well as the level of the general increases if any 
3. The breath and depth of the claims service including the network of 
correspondents and agents 
4. Location of local offices if appropriate 
5. If entered in a mutual club the aspect of compatibility with other members 
namely does the club have other members from the same country or 
region and is it familiar with the owner’s type of operation 
6. The size of the club and the implications that this may have on financial 
stability and service 
7. Personal relationship with members of the insurer’s staff 
8. The benefits of insuring other risks with the same insurer 
9. The lower limits of cover given by the commercial insurers compared to 
the exposure to the overspill calls with the IGA clubs.  
The above issues require careful examination before a decision is made by the 
shipowner on the type of insurance and insurer that is best suited to his needs. The 
target group of the FPP’s are to a large extent different from the mutual clubs. The 
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analysis of information in Table 12 show that the FPP’s are clear in their target 
market, which will be   
1. Small size vessels which are less than 30000GT  
2. Providing cover mainly to Container vessels, Dry Cargo vessels, 
Bulk    Carriers and Coastal vessels. 
3. Coverage of liability up to US$500 Million  
4. Avoiding Tankers, Passenger Vessels and vessels trading on the 
USA/Trans Atlantic and Trans Pacific routes. 
 Therefore we can safely conclude that the FPP market has a definite advantage 
over the mutual clubs in respect of small vessels, which do not trade in high-risk 
areas and therefore require limited coverage of liability.  
 
         4.9     Deficiencies and weaknesses of the fixed premium market 
 
As stated above the fixed premium segment targets only a limited portion of the 
ocean going vessels avoiding high-risk areas. This clearly shows that the FPP 
market is treading cautiously into the marine liability market and they do not 
have sufficient expertise or knowledge of this specialized industry to play a 
dominant role for the time being.  Fredrik Kruse, General Manager of the 
Swedish Club (Kruse, 2000) is of the view that in the past the prospects for the 
fixed premium P&I were grossly overstated and that the realities are different. 
1. There is always a niche market for fixed premium irrespective of what 
happens in the wider market 
2. Fixed premium tends to enjoy modest growth whenever the market is 
weak 
3. Fixed premium insurers failed to take significant tonnage from the IG   
clubs 
4. The factors that restrict the growth of the fixed premium market 
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• Fixed premium providers (FPP) are commercial entities driven by 
the need to make profits 
• FPP’s offer somewhat limited cover and tend to lack sophisticated 
claims handling infrastructure 
• FPP’s have limited capacity to buy reinsurance  
Therefore if the FPP’s are to survive in the marine liability market they should 
understand the key issue of long term commitment to shipowners and quality 
service at competitive rates. 
  
            4.10  Major changes in the mutual club market, which are of significance 
to the FPP’s 
 
1. Restructuring effort taken up by the mutual clubs 
The mutual clubs felt the need to restructure their activities in response to the 
competition from the players outside the clubs and the investigation by the 
EC on their alleged anticompetitive practices. The changes came in the form 
of 
• Amendment to IGA limiting the total liability cover to US$4.25 
Billion as against unlimited coverage 
• To publish the administrative expense ratio of the clubs for the 
last five years, which will identify the efficient clubs  
• Certain relaxations in the restriction on movement of tonnage 
from one club to another club encourage competition among the 
IGA clubs  
• To get interactive ratings from rating agencies on their financial 
performance and strength 
2. To be more responsive to the needs of the shipowners 
Providing one stop shop solution to customers through multi- product services  
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• Providing efficient service by worldwide presence- opening more 
offices or appointing correspondents. 
• To minimise the supplementary calls and reduce the percentage 
of actual calls to Estimated Total Calls (ETC) 
• To reduce the reinsurance premium by effective negotiation with 
the reinsurers 
3. To form alliances with major insurance companies in the commercial     
market to provide multi product services 
4. To appoint professional management companies for the management of   
the affairs of the companies  
 
4.11 Failure of Fixed premium insurers in P&I segment 
 
There are only a few fixed premium insurers survived and they are small. They do 
not seem to have any apparent advantage other than the certainty that the clients 
will not have to pay supplementary calls. Is this an advantage to the shipowner, 
BMM the mutual company, which demutualised recently is working on aggressive 
expansion strategy. It has merged P&I of Lloyd’s syndicate of Jonathan Jones and 
provides H&M cover for small ships (Andersson, 2001). The fixed premium 
insurer have not been in a position to make serious inroads into the business of 
Mutual clubs since entered tonnage of the mutual clubs have not declined in the 
past few years and in fact it has increased. If we look at the table given below the 
total tonnage insured by Mutual clubs rose from 471 million dwt in 1997 to 558 
million dwt in 2000 (HSBC, 2000.pp.14-50). The Fixed premium insurer can 
emerge as real force only if  
1. There is high supplementary call charged by mutual clubs 
2. High premium increase by mutual clubs  
3. Break up of International Group Agreement (IGA) 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
5.1 Is there a trend towards demutualisation of mutual insurance companies? 
 
In order to analyse the trends in the mutual market in the maritime industry it is   
pertinent to examine the trends in the general insurance industry, which is dominated 
by life and property insurers. Mutual insurance companies wrote an estimated 42% of 
the global premiums in 1997. Six of the ten largest insurance companies in the world 
are mutual insurance companies.   
             Table 13      Largest insurance companies in the world 
 
Rank 
 
Company 
 
Country 
Assets in 
US$ 
billions 
Form of 
ownership 
1 AXA France 407.9 Stock 
2 Nippon  Life Japan 323.3 Mutual 
3 Allianz Germany 293.7 Stock 
4 Prudential Insurance Company USA 259.5 Mutual 
5 Zenkyron Japan 245.4 Mutual 
6 Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Japan 219.6 Mutual 
7 Metropolitan Life USA 201.9 Mutual 
8 American International Group USA 194.4 Stock 
9 Sumitomo Life Japan 181.6 Mutual 
10 Prudential UK 178.9 Stock 
Source: Swiss Re Economic Research & Consulting, 1999(Sigma, 1999.p.5)  
 
This shows that the mutual insurance companies are a big force in the general 
insurance industry. If we look at the country wise analysis of the premiums written by 
the mutual insurers the mutuals command the largest share in Japan (more than 
75%)followed by USA (about 35%), UK, Germany and France (averaging about 
25%). The above data show that mutual insurers are dominant in Japan and USA 
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compared to Europe. Is there a trend towards demutualisation in the general insurance 
industry? The analysis of the data in the last 10 years shows a different picture.  
 
Table 14 Market share of mutual insurers in major insurance markets (in 
Percentage) 
Country Property insurance Life insurance 
 1987 1997 1987 1997 
USA 31 33 40 35 
Japan 4 3 93 89 
UK 14 8 46 33 
Germany 19 16 31 26 
France 40 37 10 5 
Aggregate 24 24 57 52 
Source: Swiss Re Economic Research & Consulting, 1999 (Sigma,1999.p.18) 
   
The overall market shares of the mutual insurers remain more or less stable in the 
property and life segment except for some regional variations. There is a perceptible 
decline in the share of the mutual insurers in the UK, Germany and France compared 
to USA and Japan. 
 
5.2 What are the circumstances that influence the demutualiation of mutual   
insurance companies? 
 
The research report (Sigma, 1999) indicates that the mutual insurers are under 
pressure to go in for demutualisation due to competition and consolidation that are 
evidenced in the general insurance industry. Over the past few decades consumer 
demand for insurance services has shifted from the traditional insurance policy cover 
to new financial products. The mutual insurers can remain mutual as long as they stay 
competitive. They can convert to stock ownership companies, which provides them 
the benefit of the opportunity to grow with access to capital but it has risks too. The 
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risk is that the stock ownership companies are susceptible to take over from other big 
players in the market. 
 
5.3     How the mutual insurance companies respond to the competition from 
other players specially the stock insurance companies? 
 
We have discussed in the earlier chapters the response of the mutual insurers to the 
competition by providing one-stop-shop solutions, reductions in supplementary calls, 
trying to offer the certainty of premium, reductions in administrative cost and looking 
for mergers and alliances. Some clubs have done away with the word ‘call’ and they 
replaced it with the word ‘premium’ like the fixed premium market. A new spirit of 
competition has taken root among the clubs consequent to the investigation by the EC 
and their conditional extension of the antitrust law exemption for the IGA. This has 
contributed to new competitive pressures and the obvious signs of this competition 
are a sudden interest in the total package, that is to say the one-stop-shop solution, 
merger discussions, more emphasis on financial strength and the launch of new 
products. (Kruse, 2000)  The mutual insurers respond to the competition from the 
stock insurance companies by providing high quality value added service and 
efficient financial management resulting in control of supplementary calls. The 
strength of the mutual insurers is in the service. Most shipowners seek quality service 
and they naturally gravitate towards those clubs with good financial strength and a 
track record of zero supplementary calls. The clubs differ from each other in financial 
strength, membership profile and claims experience. The focus of the mutual clubs in 
the competitive environment could be (Malmros, 2000) 
1. Financial certainty-Zero supplementary call 
2. P&I cover up to US$4.25 billion (with no premium cost for risk transfer in the 
US$5-30 million band) 
3. Quality of service  
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4. One-stop-shop service (a single service provider will cover H&M, P&I, FD&D, 
Loss of Hire and war risks)  
5. Proactive loss prevention support 
6. Fair and competitive premium 
There is a pressure on the clubs to reduce the administrative costs consequent to the 
decision of the EC instructing the clubs to divulge their average expense ratios. One 
way of achieving the reduction in administrative costs could be mergers of clubs, 
which would minimise the overheads. The implication of competition from the 
commercial providers is that many small clubs may merge resulting in a number of 
large clubs or some of the small clubs may get demutualised (Malmros, 2000). This 
would lead us to the next question as to what would be the optimum size for a P&I 
club? The view of Peter Crichton of the North of England P&I Association is that it 
would be 30 million tonnes (Crichton, 2000).  
 
5.4  What are the critical factors that would tell us whether the mutual insurer is 
likely to demutualise? 
 
Research carried out on the demutualisation process in the general insurance industry 
focusing on the demutualisation of life insurance companies offers an interesting 
perspective. Even though the above study focused on the mutual life insurers, the 
basic concept and purpose of mutual insurers remain the same in any segment of the 
insurance industry.  The practical implications of the conversion of the organisational 
structure from mutual to joint stock company is influenced by various critical factors 
(Carson, 1998.p.2). They are, 
1. Free cash flow 
2. Access to capital 
3. Wealth expropriation at the time of conversion 
4. Expense preference behaviour 
5. Loss ratios 
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The relationship of the variables mentioned above to the probability of 
demutualisation gave the following findings (Carson, 1998.p.6). 
The probability of demutualisation is  
1. Positively related to the level of free cash flow 
2. Positively related to the level of surplus from the members’ point of view for 
expropriation 
3. Negatively related to the level of surplus which relates to access to capital 
from the capital market 
4. Negatively related to the size of the insurer 
5. Positively related to the level of management expenses from the mutual 
insurer point of view 
6. Positively related to the losses (Loss ratio) 
Let us analyse the above factors and see how they are linked to the mutual insurance 
industry 
 
5.5 Factors which influence demutualisation of mutual clubs in    maritime    
industry 
  
Let us now try to apply the above findings to mutual P&I clubs and identify whether 
they are susceptible to demutualisation or not. In the case of mutual insurers I 
propose to consider the following as the factors that would influence demutualisation. 
The relationship between these independent variables and their effect on 
demutualisation will be analysed qualitatively to find whether a mutual club would 
have a tendency to demutualise. The data utilised for this study are the financial data 
pertaining to the mutual clubs who are members of the IGA and the data are gathered 
from various published sources and compiled in a format, which would facilitate 
analysis. The following factors are assumed to influence demutualisation. 
1. Cash flow 
• Supplementary call percentage 
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• Cost of premium as percentage of ETC 
• Release call percentage  
2. Free reserves/Surplus 
• Total free reserves per GT of entered tonnage  
• Free reserves as percentage of call income 
• Ratio of free reserves to net outstanding claims 
• Ratio of claims recoverable to gross claims outstanding 
3. Access to capital 
4. Size of the insurer 
5. Management and administrative expenses i.e. AER 
6. Losses 
7. Rate of return on investment income  
8. Ratings from specialised rating agency 
 
 5.5.1 Cashflow 
 
The free cashflow is the residual that exists after the company has invested in all 
beneficial projects (Jensen, 1986. pp.323-339). Studies indicate that the mutual 
insurers have higher free cash flow compared to stock insurance companies and 
therefore the agency costs associated with the free cash flow is higher for the mutuals 
than the stock insurers. (Mayers & Smith, 1981)(Wells, 1995). The greater the level 
of cash flow the higher the likelihood of demutualisation in order to control the 
agency costs of equity.  In the case of a mutual insurer also the level of free cash flow 
is an important factor, which determines the capacity of the insurer in prompt 
settlement of claims. 
5.5.1.1 Supplementary call 
The cash flow of a mutual insurer is directly dependent on the amount of call income 
and investment income. The members of a club normally contribute to the calls on 
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the basis of an estimate arrived at by the club keeping in view their investment 
income, estimated claims and administrative expenses. The members in one year are 
responsible collectively for the claims arising in that year and they contribute to the 
supplementary call if deficits and free reserve requirements require excess 
supplementary call.  
Table 15 Excess Supplementary call /overspill claims 
 (including the recharged cost of group excess reinsurance programme) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services 
A higher supplementary call indicates either a greater deficit or a desire to increase 
free reserve requirements. Clubs tend to look for ways and means to reduce their 
supplementary call since members may not like to have unbudgeted supplementary 
calls. The clubs may look for Alternative Risk Transfer products (ART) to stabilise 
additional supplementary calls through alliances with major reinsurers as in the case 
of the UK Club and Steamship, which worked out alliances with Swiss Re and ERC- 
Frankona. Under this new arrangement the members of these clubs in a particular 
year of account will no longer be collectively accountable for their own claims, the 
deficit will be recovered under the finite amount of calls and future year members 
have to pay the cost through incremental reinsurance premium in the later years. 
Therefore the clubs that have higher supplementary calls of more than 10% namely 
the American, the Skuld, the steamship, the West of England, the Swedish and the 
P&I CLUBS 2001 
Gard 5% 
Shipowners 5% 
Britannia 5.50% 
Standard 5.50% 
UK Club 7% 
London Club 9.50% 
North of England 11% 
Swedish Club 11% 
West of England 11.25% 
Steamship 13.50% 
Skuld 13.50% 
American Club 13.50% 
 56
North of England clubs may tend to go in for alliances with big reinsurance 
companies to provide finite calls to their members through ART. Is this arrangement 
in tune with the concept of mutuality? The Elysian P&I review report (2000) 
observes that the concept of mutuality undergoes a change under the new 
arrangement wherein the existing members may pay a finite call and new members in 
the coming years may pay additional amounts of reinsurance premium consequent to 
deficits in the earlier years. The basic tenet of mutuality gets altered in case the 
members are allowed to switch clubs they may choose the best alternative to avoid an 
increase in the premium.   
5.5.1.2 Cost of coverage as a percentage of ETC 
 
Table16 Cost of cover as Percentage of Estimated Total Call (ETC) 
(25 year average since 1976) in percentage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services 
 
Similarly many clubs are charging larger premia higher than ETC .The cost of 
coverage as a percentage of ETC for 25 years since 1976 in Table 16 shows greater 
control on calls exercised by Britannia (80%), Shipowners (87%), Japan (92%) and 
Gard (95%) in comparison to the London (125%), Swedish (125%) and West of 
England (117%) clubs. The clubs that have higher cost of coverage tend to look for 
Name of the club ETC 
Britannia  79.9 
The Shipowners  87.3 
Japan 91.7 
Gard 95.2 
The UK  101 
Steamship Mutual 102.2 
American  106.2 
Skuld 108.6 
The North of England 109.4 
The Standard  109.8 
The West of England 117 
The Swedish  117.8 
The London  124.6 
 57
ways to minimise the cost through the ART mechanism by establishing alliances with 
big insurance companies or demutualise to work out permanent arrangements with 
big players in the insurance market who offer ART. 
 
5.5.1.3 Release calls 
Table 17       Release calls of Clubs (2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services 
 
If we look at the release calls percentage in Table 17, the clubs that have higher 
release calls display their vulnerability since they expect claims in excess of the 
budgeted calls. The clubs want to protect it’s recovery of claim from departing 
members through release calls which shows that clubs are expecting to charge their 
members additional calls as reflected in the release call. However, such release calls 
lose their relevance if the clubs go in for ART since ART eliminates the prospect of 
excess calls to existing members and only future members will feel the impact. Most 
of the clubs have higher release calls of more than 15% and even 30% as in the case 
Skuld.  
The clubs that show a nominal release call of 5% are the Japan Club, Shipowners 
Club and UK Club. The higher release calls also indicate either the expected 
Name of the club Release calls  
Japan 5% 
The Shipowners Club 5% 
The UK Club 5% 
The Standard Club 15% 
Steamship Mutual 15% 
The London Club 20% 
American Club 25% 
Britannia Club 25% 
Gard 25% 
The North of England 25% 
The Swedish Club 25% 
The West of England 25% 
Skuld 30% 
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additional future claims or a fear of losing their existing members. The clubs that 
have higher release calls may tend to look for programme for reducing their future 
claims through ART or look for alliances or mergers with other clubs in order to 
maintain their market share. The clubs that have higher release calls are also 
susceptible to takeover and they may demutualise to provide finite cover. 
 
5.5.2 Free reserves 
 
The demutualisation involves a transfer of wealth to the stakeholders of mutual 
insurers. The amount of expropriation of wealth is directly related to the free cash 
flow and reserves. The higher the relative levels of cash flow and reserves are, the 
more likely it is that they would motivate the demutulisation since the members of 
mutual insurers gain more by expropriation. In the mutual insurance industry the 
relative levels of free reserves, after taking into account the outstanding claims and 
other liabilities, would represent the net assets of the mutual club, which are 
potentially available for expropriation if the mutual club is demutualised. If we look 
at the case of demutualisation of a leading marine mutual company BMM in 1999, 
BMM had as membership 1700 shipowners with 6500 ships at the time of 
demutualisation. BMM had reserves to the tune of US$41 million and annual income 
of US$69 million and it distributed around US$ 30 million to its members. This 
worked out to a sum of approximately US$4600 per ship for each member (Beatty, 
1999). The members of a mutual with large reserves and surpluses would be 
motivated by larger personal gains if they were to demutualise. The free reserves 
consist of assets extending beyond the specific provisions made for claims. Free 
reserves are held in trust by clubs for members and represent the members’ protection 
in depth. Free reserves protect members against any fluctuation in club results. The 
clubs that have strong reserves could be regarded as clubs with good financial 
strength, i.e. the Shipowners Club, London Club and Standard Club. Therefore the 
free reserves could form the basis for ascertaining the strength of the clubs by 
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working out ratios in relation to entered tonnage of the club, call income, outstanding 
losses and net outstanding claims. 
 
5.5.2.1. Free reserves per owners GT entered in the clubs 
 
The ratio of free reserves to entered tonnage may be considered as a yardstick to 
assess and compare the financial strength of the clubs. This ratio is similar to the 
member’s equity per Gross tonne of ship (GT) in the club on a break up basis with no 
provision for winding down costs. 
Table 18 Total free reserves per owners’ GT entered in the clubs (in US $) 
 
Name of the club 
 
2000 
 
1999 
 
1998 
 
1997 
Percentage increase 
in 2001 to 1997 
American  4.23 5.61 6.62 5.02 -16 
Britannia  1.85 2.18 2.68 2.92 -37 
Gard 4.55 4.89 5.07 4.14 +10 
Japan 1.05 1.04 1.00 0.97 +8 
The London  5.89 5.34 5.02 3.82 +54 
The North of England 3.38 4.01 3.14 2.71 +24 
The Shipowners  11.21 10.91 9.87 8.02 +40 
Skuld 2.46 2.65 2.67 2.98 -17 
The Standard  5.71 5.90 7.06 8.14 -29 
Steamship Mutual 2.34 2.35 2.32 1.84 +27 
The Swedish   NA    NA   NA   NA  NA* 
The UK  4.17 4.75 4.11 3.91 +7 
The West of England 4.34 4.35 3.80 2.40 +81 
*Swedish does not publish break up figures for hull and P&I insurance.    
Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services. 
From the above it may be seen that the clubs which have higher reserves per GT, 
namely the Ship owners Club, the London Club and the Standard Club as well as the 
clubs which are showing consistent increases in the free reserves namely the West of 
England Club, the London Club and the Ship Owners Club are expected to have good 
financial strength and by virtue of the high proportion of free reserves and consistent 
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increase in their reserves, they demonstrate more propensity to demutualise than the 
other clubs. 
 
5.5.2.2. Free reserves as a percentage of call income 
 
The Table 19 provides information on the strength of the clubs with reference to their 
call income. A high percentage of reserves to call income indicate the strong reserve 
position of the clubs, which are not directly dependent on an increase in the call 
income. However, a rising percentage could be due to either increased free reserves 
or falling premium or a combination of both. This ratio is similar to the conventional 
premium / surplus ratio. The clubs that have a relatively higher ratio are the London 
Club, the Standard Club, the Gard Club and the UK Club demonstrate that they have 
strong reserves and, therefore, they are more susceptible to demutualisation in 
comparison to other clubs. The reserve to call income of the Britannia Club has fallen 
by 13.1 % showing the erosion of its reserves. 
Table 19 Free reserves as a percentage of call income 
Name of the club 
2000 1999 1998 1997 % Increase in 2001 to 
1997 
American Club 97.77 102.33 83.41 70.55 38.5 
Britannia Club 91.41 99.69 110.40 105.22 -13.1 
Gard 175.56 184.23 176.74 130.39 34.6 
Japan 43.84 36.33 36.15 32.82 33.5 
The London Club 230.11 210.35 155.25 94.00 144.7 
The North of England 115.03 96.98 74.01 59.61 93.0 
The Shipowners Club 119.07 107.83 86.32 67.60 76.1 
Skuld 73.27 67.88 70.39 54.33 34.9 
The Standard Club 209.03 223.66 230.97 209.83 0 
Steamship Mutual 55.60 46.95 44.32 31.37 77.2 
The Swedish Club 146.30 142.05 105.15 77.68 84.8 
The UK Club 160.45 158.82 133.22 104.69 53.2 
The West of England 126.70 119.83 94.07 55.42 128.6 
Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services 
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5.5.2.3    Ratio of free reserves to net outstanding claims   
  Table 20   Ratio of free reserves to net outstanding claims  
Name of the club 
2000 1999 1998 % Increase in 2001 to 
1998 
American Club 43.93 51.46 45.52 - 0.04 
Britannia Club 26.09 29.86 50.82 -48.66 
Gard 55.66 63.84 70.30 -49.27 
Japan 34.85 34.35 33.30  04.65 
The London Club 48.31 43.93 42.01  15.00 
The North of E 36.07 31.22 35.82  06.97 
Skuld 32.49 79.57 36.50 -10.98 
Shipowners 87.15 67.63 71.61   21.70 
The Standard Club 65.11 64.99 74.51 -12.61 
Steamship Mutual 20.99 19.97 20.27   03.55 
The Swedish Club 77.88 77.16 78.30 - 05.36 
The UK Club 47.98 52.04 43.16   11.16 
The West of England 39.25 39.21 34.29   14.46 
  Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services 
This ratio shows the tolerance within the club for adverse claims development. How 
much reserve is available to meet adverse claims as a percentage of the net exposure 
in the balance sheet? How far can the free reserves be utilised to meet additional 
claims? This scenario may not arise since the clubs would normally go in for 
supplementary calls or ATR or other reinsurance arrangements. The clubs that show 
the highest ratios of more than 50% i.e. the Shipowners Club, the Swedish Club, the 
Standard Club and the Gard Club have adequate reserves since a large proportion of 
their reserves could be utilized for meeting outstanding losses and in contrast, the 
clubs that have weak and inadequate reserves are Britannia, Steamship and Skuld. 
The clubs that have higher ratios may have propensity to demutualise since the 
members would be motivated by large personal gains consequent to demutualisation. 
 
     5.5.2.4 Ratio of claims recoverable to gross claims outstanding 
 
The ratio of claims recoverable to gross claims outstanding indicates the reinsurance 
leverage of the club i.e. How much of the club’s gross claims liability is dependent 
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Table 21    Ratio of claims recoverable to gross claims outstanding 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
       
Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services 
upon the strength of reinsurance arrangements and how much relies on it’s own balance 
sheet. The clubs that show a higher ratio of 25% or more i.e. the Shipowners, the 
Swedish, the North of England, the Skuld and the Steamship Mutual clubs have weak 
leverage or weak reinsurance arrangements compared to the clubs such as the Japan, the 
UK and the Gard clubs that have lower ratios. Similarly the clubs that have a higher 
increase of ratios since 1998 namely the Britannia Club and the Shipowners’ Club show 
the declining leverage on reinsurance arrangements in comparison to the Japan and UK 
clubs who have improved their ratios since 1998.The clubs that have higher ratios which 
means weak reinsurance are likely to be more vulnerable to structural changes to 
improve their leverage than other clubs.  
 
5.5.3. Access to Capital  
 
The mutual insurer may convert to joint stock Company for the purpose of gaining 
access to capital markets which would be required to fund projects. If the mutual insurer 
has a high free cash flow and has no profitable project to spend it on then it would 
Name of the club 
2000 1999 1998 % Increase in 2001 to 
1998 
American Club 17.75 12.18 15.47  14.73 
Britannia Club 20.42 11.10 09.68 110.95 
Gard 13.75 15.76 13.32  03.22 
Japan 05.35 08.39 20.76 -74.22 
The London Club 14.59 15.42 13.23  10.27 
The North of E 28.04 26.02 25.96   08.01 
Skuld 27.72 26.40 24.99  10.92 
The Shipowners Club 37.94 38.24 27.88   36.08 
The Standard Club 16.47 17.62 21.07 -21.83 
Steamship Mutual 27.03 23.06 23.11  16.96 
The Swedish Club 31.87 24.68 28.37  12.34 
The UK Club 10.06 13.93 15.00 -32.93 
The West of England 16.56 16.85 18.42 -10.10 
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suggest that it would not go in for demutualisation to fund projects. (Wells,1995). The 
lower the relative levels of surplus the higher the probability of demutualisation to gain 
access to capital markets. In the case of marine insurance mutuals the demutualisation of 
BMM appears to have been prompted by their desire to increase their capital and expand 
their activities since they were a well-run club with no call crisis and good tonnage at the 
time of demutualisation. Richard Leslie, the General Manager of BMM mentioned that 
the demutualisation of BMM would increase the market share and offer more products 
to the shipowners apart from enhancing the solvency of the company. In this deal, the 
newly formed stock company British Marine Holdings received additional capital to the 
tune of US$35 million from an investment company Capital Z Financial Services Fund 
II L.P. This investment company is a US$1.85 billion global private equity fund focused 
on the insurance, financial services and health care services industries (Beatty, 1999). 
Therefore, the demutualisation of a well-run mutual club could also be prompted by 
their desire to access capital and increase their market share.  The clubs that have the 
lowest reserves namely the Japan , the Britannia the Steamship Mutual and the Skuld 
clubs have higher propensity to demutualise in order to access capital and finance their 
expansion plans. 
5.5.4 Size of the insurer 
The steps in the demutualisation process include obtaining approval for conversion from 
a majority of the directors, insurance regulatory authorities and the majority (normally 
two thirds) of voting members. (Garber, 1986) (Hemmings, 1995). In addition, other 
approvals are required under the relevant legislation from the tax authorities and labour 
departments. The larger the mutual insurer the more cumbersome 
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Table 22 Size of the club (based on entered tonnage (Million GT)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services 
 
the process of demutualisation, and, therefore, the larger mutuals are less likely to 
undergo a demutualisation process. The above aspect is relevant to mutual marine 
insurers if the membership is quite large and the pattern of distribution of members 
country wise shows that the members of a particular club are spread out all over the 
world. However, this aspect may not be decisive since some mutual clubs are more 
regionally oriented with membership concentrated from particular regions and relatively 
few owner members hold a voting majority in the club. In any case, the above aspect is 
one of the important factors for consideration at the time of demutualisation. The larger 
clubs who have more than 10% market share such as the UK, the Gard, the Britannia 
and the Steamship Mutual clubs may look for opportunities to merger with small clubs 
such as the American Club or the Swedish Club in order to increase their market share. 
The much talked about merger of the Standard and the Britannia did not materialise last 
year but such mergers are expected in future. 
 
Club 2000 
Market 
Share % 
The UK Club 90.3 15.98 
Gard 89.8 15.89 
Britannia Club 79.0 13.98 
Steamship Mutual 64.1 11.35 
Japan 48.0 08.50 
The Standard Club 42.0 07.44 
Skuld 39.6 07.00 
The West of England 37.0 06.55 
The London Club 25.8 04.57 
The North of England 21.3 03.77 
The Swedish Club 13.7 02.42 
The Shipowners Club 08.2 01.45 
American Club 06.2 01.10 
Total 565 100 
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5.5.5 Management and administrative expenses 
 
Table 23 Average Expense Ratio (5Years on 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
                                  Source: Elysian Insurance Services 
 
There were some studies conducted in 1980’s which indicate that the mutual 
organisations have higher administrative and management expenses than stock 
companies (Frech, 1980, O’Hara, 1981). The above research is old and the managers 
may have learnt from them or changed behaviour but managers of mutual 
organizations cannot share the benefits of the ownership, such as stock options or 
bonuses linked to the profit which gives rise to expenses preference behaviour in the 
form of consumption of more perquisites and agency costs. (Verbruggae & Goldstein, 
1981). Until recently the mutual marine insurers who are members of the IGA were 
not obliged to disclose their administrative expenses and When the issue of 
exemption from competition legislation came up for approval before the European 
Commission, the Commission found this to be anti competitive and instructed the 
members of the IGA to disclose their 5 year Average Expense Ratio (AER). The 
result of this exercise was that many clubs with higher administrative cost were 
forced to find ways and means of cutting the cost including mergers and alliances. 
Name of the Club 5 year AER 
Japan 5.68 
The London Club 5.8 
Britannia Club 7.31 
Gard 7.4 
The North of England 7.7 
The Standard Club 7.9 
The UK Club 8.12 
The Swedish Club 8.26 
American Club 8.4 
The West of England 8.52 
Steamship Mutual 8.7 
Skuld 9 
The Shipowners Club 16 
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The clubs can compete effectively within the IGA as long as they have a better AER. 
Therefore, the average expense ratio of a mutual club is one of the indicators for 
demutualisation. 
 
The publication of AER was as a result of the negotiation with the EC when it 
agreed to the new exemption in 1999.The following factors may distort AER (Elysian 
P&I review, 2000) 
1. Size of the vessel  
2. High level of deductible agreed by owners and consequent low premium 
3. Clubs with more regional offices may offer better service to their members with 
more expense 
4. Clubs with good record able to reduce it’s calls to it’s members can produce the 
same AER as a club with a poor record and which has a high premium level. 
In general, higher AER ratios as in the case of the shipowners, the Skuld, the 
Steamship Mutual, the West of England and the UK clubs (above 8%) indicate that 
the clubs are incurring higher administrative costs, which might drain their reserves 
or may result in enhanced call premium, are susceptible to merger or takeover in 
order to bring down their administrative cost.  
 
5.5.6 Losses 
 
The mutual insurer may have higher losses due to various reasons including poor 
underwriting or under pricing its services. Sustained high loss ratios would reduce the 
reserves, which will affect the growth prospects and solvency of a mutual insurance 
company. This may also trigger the need to go in for additional capital but access to 
capital could be possible only through demutualisation. Therefore, a higher loss ratio 
is associated with a higher probability of demutualisation. Most of the clubs have 
underwriting losses for the past five years due to a fall in rates of premium and 
increase in claims. The clubs faced competition from fixed premium providers as 
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well as hull insurers who entered the P&I market to cover up the losses in Hull 
market. In the year 2000 only two clubs generated an underwriting profit, i.e. the 
Standard and the Steamship clubs. The remaining clubs continue to sustain losses, 
many for at least the fifth consecutive year. The clubs that have high underwriting 
losses have limited options to minimize losses except going in for increases in calls or 
utilising the reserves or cutting costs. In a competitive market it will be difficult to 
increase the calls and, therefore, the clubs, which have been sustaining losses for the 
past 5 years, may tend to merge or form alliances or demutualise in order to survive 
in the market. 
Table 24 Underwriting result of IGA (in US$ ´000) 
 
 
Name of the club 
1999-2000 
(12 months) 
1998-99 
(12 months) 
1997-98 
(12 months) 
1996-97 
(36 months) 
American Club    -9707   -4923   -4011      -13 
Britannia Club -21396 -29492 -11602     421 
Gard   -2124    7579   15462 31352 
Japan NA NA NA NA 
The London Club -21600 -29900 -30900 NA 
The North of England -10520   -5572   -6156  -5277 
The Shipowners Club   -4468   -3622 NA   2200 
Skuld -13500   -3400    4100     360 
The Standard Club    5281    1742    6477   1023 
Steamship Mutual     691 25112  23755 14590 
The Swedish Club NA NA NA NA 
The UK Club -109225 -81631 -88735 -86770 
The West of England     -5673      476      534    1786 
             Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services 
 
5.5.7 Investment Income 
 
The investment income forms an important component of income of mutual clubs 
and the determination of estimated call income depends on the amount of investment 
income the club is expected to earn in a particular year. The investments of clubs are 
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spread in fixed assets, equities and other investments. Nowadays most of the clubs 
engage professional investment advisors for investments and some clubs 
 
Table 25 Percentage of investment Income for the period 1999-2000 
 
Name of the Club Percentage of investment income 
The North of England 0.52 
Japan 1.64 
The West of England 3.18 
Britannia Club 4.66 
American Club 5.60 
Skuld 5.68 
The Standard Club 5.99 
The London Club 6.30 
The Swedish Club 6.52 
The UK Club 6.84 
Gard 7.10 
Steamship Mutual 9.05 
The Shipowners Club 9.50 
                       
           Source: P&I review 2000, Elysian Insurance services 
 
achieved high returns from large holdings of equities wherein the risk is higher. The 
clubs that have large reserves have large amounts of capital to invest such as the 
Britannia Club, which over the years established a very substantial balance and 
achieved considerable investment returns. The clubs that have a higher proportion of 
investment income as a percentage of total funds, such as the Shipowners, the 
Steamship Mutual and the Gard clubs, were able to minimise their call income 
requirement from members and they have an advantage over the clubs, which have a 
lower percentage, such as North of England and Japan. The clubs that have a lower 
proportion of investment income of less than 4% namely the North of England, the 
Japan and the West of England clubs may have propensity to demutualise or undergo 
other forms structural changes such as mergers or alliances in order to increase their 
investment income which would improve their bottomline.  
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 5.5.8 Ratings given by specialized rating agency  
 
        Table 26     Ratings from Standard & Poor’s 
Name of the club 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 
American Club BBB BBB BBB BBB+* 
Britannia Club A A A A 
Gard A A A A 
Japan BB BB BB BB 
The London Club BBB A A A 
The North of England BBB BBB BBB A-* 
The Shipowners Club A A A A 
Skuld BBB BBB BBB BB 
The Standard Club A A AA- AA-* 
Steamship Mutual BBB BBB BBB BBB 
The Swedish Club BBB BBB BBB BBB 
The UK Club A A A AA-* 
The West of England BBB BBB BBB BBB 
                        *These clubs have obtained interactive ratings from S&P 
Source: Modified data from Marsh P&I review, 2000 and HSBC P&I review, 2000  
The ratings given by rating agencies reflect the financial strength of the clubs. The 
ratings also give an indication as to whether the clubs will be in a position to survive the 
competition within the IGA as well as from commercial insurers. The ratings also 
provide information to shipowners as an aid to decide on the reliability of the insurer and 
the mutual clubs that have higher ratings are in a better position to increase their market 
share than the ones with poor ratings. Therefore, the clubs that have poor ratings are 
susceptible to takeover or merger with other clubs who have better ratings. Furthermore, 
the clubs with better ratings may tend to demutualise in order to increase their market 
share and diversify their business into non-P&I and even non-marine insurance business. 
The Standard and Poor ratings predicted the vulnerability of the Ocean Marine Club, 
which became insolvent as well as the New castle, the Liverpool and London clubs, 
which were taken over. The clubs that have marginal ratings of BB or lower, i.e. the 
Skuld and the Japan clubs may look for alliances or mergers if their ratings are further 
downgraded in future. 
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5.6      Summary of analysis and result 
 
In summary the relationship of various factors, which determine the changes in the 
structure and operation of the club is given below. The general term ‘structural 
change’ is used since the club may choose to go in for any of the structural changes 
like mergers, alliances or demutualisation in order to survive and stabilize their 
business activity.  To arrive at conclusions as to which clubs are likely to undergo 
structural change, certain assumptions on the benchmarking of figures were applied. 
These assumptions were based on discussion with certain insurance clubs and 
information gathered from various P&I review reports For example, only 
supplementary calls of above 12% were considered to influence structural changes and 
the rest of the clubs were not considered for that factor. 
1. Cashflow 
• The higher the supplementary calls the stronger the tendency 
towards structural changes. The supplementary calls of above 
12% are considered to influence the structural changes.  
• The higher the cost of premium as percentage of ETC the greater 
is the chance of structural changes. The percentage of cost of 
premium on ETC of above 110 is considered to influence 
structural changes.  
• The lesser the release calls the weaker the inclination towards 
structural changes. The release calls of above 25% are considered 
to influence the structural changes     
2. Free reserves 
• The higher the free reserves the stronger the tendency towards 
structural changes  
• Reserves per GT of more than US$4 are expected to influence 
structural changes  
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• Free reserves as a percentage of call income of more than 150% 
are expected to influence structural changes. 
• A ratio of free reserves to net outstanding claims of more than 50 
is considered to influence structural changes.  
• A ratio of claims recoverable to gross claims of more than 25 is 
considered to influence structural changes.  
    3. Access to capital 
• A need to access capital arises when the club has low reserves. 
The lower the reserves of a mutual club the higher the chances of 
demutualisation to bring in financial stability and expand their 
business  
      4.   Size of the club 
• An entered tonnage of more than 50 million GT (say about 10 % 
of total tonnage of P&I clubs) is considered to influence structural 
changes in the club.  
5. Management and administrative expenses 
• An Average Expense Ratio (AER) of 8% or more is considered to 
influence structural changes in the club.  
6.   Underwriting losses 
• Even though higher underwriting losses may trigger the clubs to 
go in for structural changes, there is no significant trend was 
observed in the data relating to the underwriting losses of various 
clubs since many clubs were incurring losses for more than 5 
years. 
      7.  Rate of return on investment 
• A rate of return on investments of 4% or less is considered to 
influence structural changes in the club. 
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8.  Rating given by specialised rating agencies. 
• A lower rating of BB or below given by the specialized rating 
agency Standard & Poor is considered to influence structural 
changes in the club. 
   
 Based on the above parameters the clubs that were short-listed are given below. The 
clubs that had the greatest number of factors are considered to be strong candidates for 
structural changes. The clubs are grouped based on the number of points obtained by 
them. A Summary of the analysis is given in Appendix:A. 
Group 1: very strong tendency towards structural change - Clubs that had total 
points in the range of 9-12  
Group 2: strong tendency towards structural change - Clubs that had total points 
in   the range of 5 - 8   
Group 3: Clubs that have a weak tendency towards structural change  - Clubs 
that had total points in the range of 1-4. 
Based on the analysis presented in the above table the clubs are grouped as under 
Group 1 - None 
Group 2 - Skuld, Gard, Steamship, Swedish and West of England  
Group 3 – American, Britannia, Japan, London, North of England, Ship Owner,  
Standard and UK  
From the above it may be inferred that the Skuld, the Japan, the Gard, the Swedish, 
the Steamship mutual and the West of England have a strong tendency towards 
structural change, which may be merger, alliance or demutualisation. The clubs 
that showed the weak tendency towards structural change are the American, the 
Britannia, the London, the Japan, the North of England, the Shipowner, the 
Standard and The UK clubs. Even though all the clubs are grouped into two 
categories if we look at the critical factors and deviation from cut off limit, the 
clubs Skuld and Steamship have strong tendency to demutualise than other clubs 
 73
in Group 2. Similarly in Group 3, the clubs Japan and London have weak tendency 
towards demutusalisation. In respect of other clubs they are favourably positioned 
to undergo structural changes in the coming years. One interesting observation is 
that out of the thirteen clubs five clubs have shown a strong tendency in varying 
degrees, which explains changes that are happening in the mutual marine industry. 
The present dominance of the mutual clubs will continue for some time and their 
survival is enhanced by the consolidation effort that has been taking place among 
the mutual clubs. This might result in the emergence of certain super clubs who 
are efficient and strong and they may decide to demutualise if the circumstances 
warrant that they need to grow big and access funds from the capital market. 
Similarly the emergence of some FPP’s as big players in the P&I segment is not 
ruled out notwithstanding the fact that this segment is dominated by the mutual 
clubs.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1  Challenges faced by marine mutuals 
 
There are an ever-increasing number of changes happening in the general 
insurance industry, which poses challenges to the marine insurance industry. 
The mutual marine industry which controls about 80% of P&I insurance stood 
united when they faced the challenge from the European Commission (EC) 
investigating their anti competitive practices. The approval given by the EC to 
the International Group Agreement (IGA) for another ten years up to 2009 was 
a big relief to all mutual insurers. However, one should not forget that the 
approval was given with a rider that there should be fair competition among the 
clubs who form part of the IGA and transparency in their operation. Whether 
such competition among IGA members will pose a challenge to the survival of 
the IGA is a big question? The benefits, which clubs used to derive from being 
members of the IGA are diminishing or becoming insignificant, especially with 
the emergence of Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) products. The other aspect, 
which poses a challenge to the IGA is the emergence of a trend of consolidation 
among mutual clubs, i.e. mergers, acquisitions, alliances and demutualisation. 
Such a trend witnessed in the last few years, has contributed to the demise of 
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two clubs, the New castle Club and the Liverpool & London Club, which 
merged with the North of England Club. Similar mergers are not ruled out in 
future and this may result in the development of a few big clubs, which would 
compete with each other and control a major share of the marine insurance 
market. What is going to be the role of the IGA in such a scenario? It may be 
insignificant since the big clubs would be in a position to bargain for better 
reinsurance premia and provide higher limits of cover than those currently 
available to the IGA. 
 
6.2 Changes in the marine insurance industry 
 
The mutual insurance industry has faced competition from fixed premium 
insurers, which triggered certain important changes in the mutual marine 
industry, inter alia ( Mitchell, 2001)  
• Decline in the rates of insurance premia 
• Reduction in management and administrative expenses i.e. Average 
Expense Ratio (AER) 
• Reduction in supplementary calls 
• Improvement in quality of service of mutual clubs 
• Provision of one- stop-shop services to meet the changing needs of 
shipowners 
• Demutualisation of some mutual clubs 
• Alliances and mergers of some mutual clubs with big players in the 
insurance sector. 
 
6.3 Why Fixed premium providers failed in their effort? 
 
The above changes were swiftly adopted by the mutual marine industry meet  
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the new competition from the fixed premium providers. The fact of the matter 
is that the Fixed Premium providers (FPP) could not make inroads into the 
mutual marine industry and are now confined to small ship segment with 
limited amount of cover up to US$ 500 million in contrast to US$ 4.25 billion 
offered by IGA clubs. Perhaps the blessing in disguise is the changes that the 
FPP’s have brought in to the mutual industry. 
The failure of FPP’s could be attributed to the following reasons  
1. Timing of their entry into market, i.e. when the insurance business 
cycle is at it’s downward cycle 
2. Quick and united response from mutual insurers in making 
structural changes to counter the advantage of FPP 
• Consolidation among mutual clubs 
• Introduction of certainty of premium – fixed calls in 
contrast to unbudgeted calls 
• No supplementary calls 
• Adoption of ART products to provide finite calls 
• Cut in insurance premium and reduction in reinsurance cost 
In retrospect the failure of FPP is only a temporary phenomenon and a second 
assault when the insurance market cycle in it’s upward trend is not ruled out. 
They may be successful in their second attempt if mutual clubs are slack in 
keeping pace with the changes that are taking place in the commercial 
insurance market. 
 
6.4 Is the concept of mutuality relevant in marine insurance today? 
 
The system of mutuality relied on stakeholders’ culture, pooling of risk, 
cohesion and benevolent monopoly. Nowadays, the needs of shipowners are 
changing very fast due to the sophistication of delivery systems for insurance 
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products. In contrast to the personal one to one approach of brokers with 
underwriters shipowners nowadays have direct access to information on 
availability of insurance coverage and terms and conditions from all over the 
world and decide on the insurer who is best suited to the interest of the 
particular shipowner. The technological development, therefore, constitutes a 
direct attack on the relationship of insurance, which continues to be at the heart 
of most marine mutual insurers. The cohesion and benevolent monopoly also 
suffer due to competition. The individual shipowners who are aware of the 
alternatives may refuse to cross-subsidise other members of the mutual clubs 
who contribute less to the bottom line. Therefore, the long-term survival of the 
mutual concept is unlikely unless the mutual insurers come out with some 
innovative mechanism to meet the changing needs of the shipowners in a 
technologically highly sophisticated environment. 
 
6.5 Is demutualisation a viable option to mutual clubs?    
 
Studies seem to point towards demutualisation as one of the most important 
options. The worldwide insurance industry was dominated by mutuals a decade 
back. Since then there has been a trend towards their demutualisation, which 
saw many mutual insurance companies in the life insurance sector 
demutualising. Even though Swiss Re in it’s latest report (Sigma, 1999) 
observed that mutual insurers have some fundamental advantages over the joint 
stock companies and should reconsider the decision of rushing to demutualise, 
the trend towards demutualisation is clear. The fundamental advantage that a 
mutual insurer has is the cost advantage of having no customer – owner conflict 
and flexible pricing. However for the time being it appears that the advantages 
of demutualisation outweigh the disadvantages. This was clearly evident when 
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one of the mutual marine insurance providers BMM demutualised in 1999 in 
order to access additional capital and expand their activities. 
 
6.6    What does demutualisation mean for the mutual marine insurance 
industry and what are the critical factors that influence demutualisation? 
 
There are no such studies carried out in the mutual marine industry. However 
the studies carried out in the general insurance industry identified, free cash 
flow, access to capital, wealth expropriation at the time of conversion, expense 
preference behaviour and loss ratio as critical factors that influence 
demutualisation. Applying the results of the above study in combination with 
P&I research reports published by Elysian Insurance Services (2000), Marsh 
(2000) and HSBC (2000), eight critical factors namely free cash flow, the free 
reserves, the access to capital, the size of the insurer, the management and 
administrative expenses i.e. AER, underwriting losses, the rate of return on 
investment income and the ratings given by S&P were taken up for study to 
examine their influence on demutualisation of mutual clubs. To examine the 
Cash flow, the Supplementary call percentage, Cost of premium as percentage 
of ETC and Release call percentage were considered. To analyse the Free 
reserves/Surplus, the total free reserves per GT of entered tonnage, the free 
reserves as percentage of call income, the ratio of free reserves to net 
outstanding claims and the ratio of claims recoverable to gross claims 
outstanding were examined. 
The analysis data relating to the 13 P&I clubs who are members of the IGA 
revealed that  
• Skuld and Steamship mutual has strong tendency towards 
structural change, which may be merger or alliance or 
demutualisation.  
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• London and Japan club showed weak tendency towards 
structural change  
• Out of 13 clubs 5 clubs have shown strong tendency in 
different degrees. 
• Other clubs are favourably positioned to undergo structural 
changes in the coming years. 
 
 
6.7 Recommendations 
 
1. Mutual clubs should reorient themselves to meet the following challenges   and 
trends  
 
• Globalisation markets 
• Consolidation and Specialisation 
• Increased competition 
• New competitors 
• New products 
• Alternative distribution channels 
• Changes in customer needs 
• Changes in the security perception of vessel operation 
• Reducing margins and increasing costs 
• Increasing sophistication and complexity of information technology 
including e-commerce 
• Increased risk requiring innovative risk transfer vehicles. 
2. Mutual clubs should not shy away from changing basic structure if the          
circumstances especially the changing needs of shipowners so warrant. 
 
3. The mutual marine insurance industry should be alive to changes in the general 
insurance industry and apply knowledge taken from other industries to marine 
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sector. This includes mainly customer behaviour, distribution, perception and 
service. 
4. The mutual marine industry should keep their option open to the following                      
six key imperatives facing any financial service organisation. 
• Mergers and Acquisitions 
• Risk management (ability to identify, manage and allocate risk exposure 
on global basis) 
• Time to market new products and services 
• Customer management 
• Corporate repositioning and branding 
• Non interest expense reduction by shared services, outsourcing and 
competitive positioning 
5. Mutual clubs should keep in view that their brand values which relied on 
shipowners trust and trust are no longer enough to provide sustainable 
competitive advantage to them. 
6. Mutual clubs should be aware of the implications of technological development 
especially the developments in information technology, evolving roles of state 
including deregulation and implementation of anticompetitive and anti trust laws. 
7. Mutual clubs should realise that the development of information technology has 
broken the information barrier between the shipowner and underwriter. This in 
turn has contributed to the commoditisation of insurance services that encourages 
competition by products on the basis of price rather than historical relationships. 
8. Mutual clubs should be aware of threats from non-marine insurance providers 
who control communication networks and the gateways could set themselves up 
as brokers directing customers to the best product. In such a scenario the loyalty 
of customer would increasingly be to the broker rather than the producer of the 
product or the one who actually provides the insurance service. 
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Appendix A 
Volume of  Business of P&I Mutual Clubs 
(in terms of number of vessels) 
 
 
Name of the Club 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
American Club 900 960 915 912 1037 NA 
Britannia Club 3139 3268 3426 3396 3489 3736 
Gard 4984 4878 4666 4596 4418 4257 
Japan 9620 9480 9074 8563 7948 7387 
The London Club 920 941 955 956 952 931 
The North of England 1151 1311 1382 1491 1775 1648 
The Shipowners Club 21120 22260 23756 24593 21827 23500
Skuld 4912 5136 5500 5577 5521 5133 
The Standard Club 2154 2245 2234 2303 2400 2550 
Steamship Mutual 3398 3898 4373 4684 4815 4974 
The Swedish Club 447 463 495 540 610 722 
The UK Club 5000 5450 5000 5000 5350 5665 
The West of England 6900 6700 6800 6750 6900 6000 
Total 64645 66990 68576 69361 67042 66503
 
Source :P&I Review of 2000,HSBC Insurance Brokers Limited, Marine Division. 
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  Appendix B 
   Volume of Business of P&I Mutual 
                                     (In terms of Entered Tonnage in Million GT) 
 
Name of the Club 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
American Club 4.1 4.8 6.1 6.8 8.8 6.2 
Britannia Club 59 63 69 69.1 73.5 79 
Gard 74.5 79.3 84.1 86.3 89.3 89.8 
Japan 43.3 46.3 46.5 47.2 47.9 48 
The London Club 23.8 26.6 25.7 25.16 24.83 25.81 
The North of England 11.2 14 16.5 19 22.1 21.3 
The Shipowners Club 5.6 6.2 6.6 6.9 7.4 8.2 
Skuld 27.2 28.9 32.6 38.1 40.5 39.6 
The Standard Club 29.5 30.9 33.5 38.1 41 42 
Steamship Mutual 61.1 63.1 68.5 67.8 63 64.1 
The Swedish Club 8.6 8.9 9.8 10.4 10.9 13.7 
The UK Club 91 91 91 91 91 90.3 
The West of England 32.4 35.7 38 38.3 38.7 37 
 
Source: P&I Review of 2000,HSBC Insurance Brokers Limited, Marine Division. 
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Appendix C 
Analysis of factors that influence structural changes in mutual clubs. 
Name of the 
club 
Suppl. 
call 
above 
12% 
 ETC 
above 
110% 
Release 
calls 
above 
25% 
Free 
Reserves 
per GT 
above US$4 
per GT 
FR to  
call 
income 
above 
150% 
R1 
above 
50 
R2 
above 
25 
 
Access to 
Capital 
Market 
share  
above 
10% 
AER 
above 
8% 
Investment 
income less 
4% 
 
Rating 
of BB or 
below  
S&P  
Total 
points  
American  X  X X      X   4 
Britannia    X     X X    3 
Gard   X X X X   X    5 
Japan        X   X X 3 
London   X  X X        3 
North of E   X    X    X  3 
Skuld X  X    X X  X  X 6 
Shipowners     X  X X   X   4 
Standard     X X X       3 
Steamship  X      X X X X   5 
Swedish   X X   X X   X   5 
UK Club    X X    X X   4 
West of E  X X X      X X  5 
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